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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Since the turn of the twentieth century, middle-class Americans have considered the thin 
body—ostensibly the result of self-control and self-discipline—a moral imperative and a symbol 
of good citizenship. In this thesis, I provide a critical perspective on fat studies by examining the 
ways in which the field authorizes itself in a society that deems the fat body unhealthy, costly, 
and immoral. As one potential solution to fat-hatred, fat studies proposes fat-positivity, but I 
argue that fat-positivity requires an extraordinary act of imagination in which the fat person 
overcomes what I term the ideology of thinness and subsequently feels good about herself. 
Importing models of ambivalence from disability studies, I propose ambivalence as an 
alternative to fat-positivity. I argue that ambivalence is a legitimate response when living in a 
society that de-values one's embodiment, but ambivalence is undertheorized by fat studies 
scholars. In Chapter 2, I analyze from a feminist perspective Tweets with the hashtag “feeling 
fat,” tracing the emotion to cultural ambivalence about consumption and consumerism. In 
Chapter 3, I examine how the genre of the fat memoir authorizes itself during an “obesity 
epidemic” and what those methods reveal about gendered selfhood. Instead of indicting these 
Twitter users and fat memoirists for their purported lack of fat-positivity, I emphasize instead the 
social situations that give rise to these cultural forms. I suggest that drawing attention to 
ambivalence is a form of political resistance.   
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
INTRODUCTION: THINNESS AS IDEOLOGY 
 
“Between ages five and nine, 40 percent of girls say they wish they were thinner. Almost 
one-third of third-grade girls report they are ‘always’ afraid of becoming fat. These 
young girls are not worried about their weight because of health concerns.” 
- Renee Engeln in Beauty Sick: How the Cultural Obsession with Appearance Hurts 
Girls and Women  
 
It’s the 1970s, and future literary agent Betsy Lerner is twelve years old, a fat girl 
standing in a line as if on a conveyer belt, waiting her turn as the gym teacher barks numbers: 
100, 105, 88, 120. Weighing the smallest girl in the class, the teacher “slides the balance to the 
left, lower and lower. Finally, she calls out, ‘seventy-eight.’” Lerner, up next, fills with shame 
because that’s what she weighed in the third grade (Lerner 4).  
 Writer Laura Fraser describes a similar scene, this time with adults at a weekly Weight 
Watchers weigh-in: “the line started at the bathroom, which everyone visited first to make sure 
they didn’t weigh an ounce too much, some of them even spitting in the sink” (138).  
 New York Times journalist Taffy Brodesser-Akner had been dieting for twenty-five years 
when she finally lost it during an intuitive-eating class: “I am 41 and accomplished and a beloved 
wife and a good mother and a hard worker and a contributor to society and I am learning how to 
eat a goddamned raisin.” 
 And here I am, sitting at a vegan restaurant in Los Angeles with three women: an 
assistant dean at the University of California-Los Angeles, a corporate planner, and Cathy, who 
oversees more than one hundred people at her company and who recently opened up to me about 
her son’s leukemia years ago. We are here for our first book club meeting, but the conversation 
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revolves instead around three pounds: the three pounds Cathy can’t lose. She has tried 
everything, she says, and she’s ready to give up on working out and eating right if she can’t 
reach her target weight.  
 What is going on?  
Doctors, billboards, and every single magazine at the grocery check-out counter foist on 
us the same solution to the problem of the female body: watch or lose your weight, even if 
you’re not (yet) fat. Find a program or a cosmetic surgeon. Achieve the discipline. Get the body 
under control. Losing weight is easier than changing society. A discourse that contributes to the 
construction of fat as a negative or spoiled identity, then, is self-help discourse, which puts the 
onus on the individual (and not society) to change herself and through this act of agency to 
become a better, happier, and more authentic person. Indeed, to be an American, it seems we—or 
our children—must become something other than what we are or at least a better version of it. 
For instance, Oprah Winfrey says in a commercial for Weight Watchers: let’s make this year 
“the year of our best bodies.” Why do we have to? We live in a self-help culture, which 
“involves the pursuit of the . . . elusive and variable state of self-fulfillment” (McGee 19). How 
does one measure self-fulfillment in a consumer culture designed to undermine it? Self-help 
discourse, or this process of continual and in many ways burdensome becoming, is 
undertheorized by cultural historians of fat as well as fat studies scholars, and its appeal has not 
been properly situated as a major contributor to fat stigma and diet culture. 
 In this introduction chapter, I provide a critical perspective on fat studies by examining 
the ways in which the field authorizes itself in a self-help culture that deems the fat body 
unhealthy, costly, and immoral. Fat studies begins with the assumption that fat is not inherently 
unhealthy. Furthermore, fat studies scholars draw on the rhetoric of liberal individualism to 
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argue that fat people—fat women especially—are unfairly discriminated against in schools, the 
workplace, and the doctor’s office.  
The focus on health promotes healthism, however, or the idea that there is something 
morally wrong with unhealthy people. Furthermore, although dozens of academic studies prove 
that fat people are treated differently than thin people, this unequal treatment is not codified in 
law but rather emerges in complex and amorphous ways. I suggest that thinness might be more 
usefully conceived by fat studies scholars not as an attainable embodiment but as a powerful 
ideology affecting everyone, regardless of her body size.  
As a solution to fat-hatred, fat studies proposes size acceptance, fat-positivity, and fat 
pride (I use the terms interchangeably), but fat-positivity requires an act of imagination in which 
the fat person overcomes the ideology of thinness and subsequently feels good about herself. In 
many ways, fat-positivity relies on the same self-help narrative of dieting: an autonomous 
individual exercises her freedom and finds a truer, more liberated self. In an effort to create a 
more inclusive fat politics that asks less of the stigmatized person, I import models of 
ambivalence from disability studies, and I frame ambivalence as a potential form of resistance to 
this ideology of thinness—a form of resistance that does not equate health or happiness with 
morality and credibility.  
 
Fat Studies: Scholarship in Defense of Fat 
 
This thesis project examines how the discourses of medicine, psychology, and self-help 
coalesce in popular American culture, thereby encouraging certain everyday practices (dieting 
and ‘feeling fat’) as well as creating identities (the lazy fat person and the disciplined thin one). I 
seek to de-naturalize these practices and identities and reveal them as contingent. Supporting the 
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goals of fat studies, I situate my project within that field, but I want to trouble some of the field’s 
central methodologies.   
What is fat studies? According to the Fat Studies page on the Popular Culture Association 
website (an organization credited with helping to develop the field of fat studies – see Wann, p. 
xi):  
Fat studies is an interdisciplinary, cross-disciplinary field of study that confronts and 
critiques cultural constraints against notions of “fatness” and “the fat body”; 
explores fat bodies as they live in, are shaped by, and remake the world; and creates 
paradigms for the development of fat acceptance or celebration within mass 
culture. Fat Studies uses body size as the starting point for a wide-ranging theorization 
and explication of how societies and cultures, past and present, have conceptualized all 
bodies and the political/cultural meanings ascribed to every body. Fat Studies reminds us 
that all bodies are inscribed with the fears and hopes of the particular culture they reside 
in, and these emotions often are mislabeled as objective “facts” of health and biology. 
More importantly, perhaps, Fat Studies insists on the recognition that fat identity can be 
as fundamental and world-shaping as other identity constructs analyzed within the 
academy and represented in media. 
 
Let us focus first on the antagonistic relationship between health and fat studies. According to 
the editors of The Fat Studies Reader, Harvard University Press would not publish the book 
because it seemed to fly in the face of medical research: “I think I’d have trouble at various 
stages of the review process,” the senior editor said, “with a book that discounted, or seemed to 
discount, the health risks of obesity” (Solovay and Rothblum 7). For this editor, fat is an 
acceptable topic only when embedded in medical discourse aimed at its eradication. In fact, fat 
studies scholars refuse to use medicalized language, such as “overweight,” “obese,” or “super 
morbidly obese,” preferring instead the three-letter word: fat.  
Although spurred by the fat acceptance movement of the 1970s (Farrell 140-145), 
arguably it was only when professors began undermining the link between health and weight that 
a space opened up for fat studies in the academy, a development significant in and of itself 
because it suggests the extent to which medical discourse—health as a moral imperative—has 
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colonized our collective thinking. In other words, for those living during the “obesity epidemic,” 
it is difficult to see fat as anything but a straightforward health issue. Why wouldn’t we want to 
be healthier? Let’s eat less and move more. Problem solved! The difficulty of seeing fat within a 
context other than health suggests an intrinsic relationship between fat and other categories of 
identity, such as sexuality, ethnicity, disability, and intersex—all considered, at one time or 
another, medical issues. For example, known as the father of Western medicine, Hippocrates 
thought of women as undercooked, deformed men. Until 1987, some variant of homosexuality 
appeared in the DSM as a psychological disorder (Burton). The medieval myth of the Jewish 
male menses and the identification of hemorrhoids as a Jewish disease provide further examples 
(Resnick 242-263). Finally, according to one influential sexologist, a broad pelvis in women 
correlated with the ‘higher,’ that is, the white European, human races (Markowitz 402). 
Medicine, it seems, has a long history of using bodies and their supposed deficiencies (or culture 
has a long history of using medicine) as justification for dehumanizing groups of people.  
When does medicalization of bodily conditions or types of embodiment, such as fat, 
result in discrimination? When does it help people—transgender people, for instance—gain 
access to the care they need? Ambivalence about medicalization is justified and demands more 
attention, albeit only tangentially in this thesis. Though the Victorians considered masturbation a 
disease, for instance, when Kinsey and other sexologists found that 90 percent of men 
masturbated, it became statistically normal and even healthy (Conrad 97). This has not been the 
case with fat.  
The Centers for Disease Control warns that two-thirds of Americans are overweight, yet 
overweight is still considered abnormal, as the word “overweight” implies a right weight. Similar 
to an astrological chart, every person who is 5’5 should fall within a “normal” range, a range 
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with a fascinating history (originally based on mid-century insurance tables), and a range that 
changes over the years for no medical reason. Indeed, Body Mass Index (BMI) charts seem to be 
“a better measurement of social acceptability than morbidity or mortality” (Heyes 68). Today a 
woman of average height—5’3—is considered overweight if she weighs 141 pounds. The 
problem with using BMI across a population is that BMI cannot say what any one individual 
should weigh (Burgard 44)—individuals with different builds, men versus women, manual 
laborers versus book editors, people of different ethnicities, pregnant women, cancer patients 
undergoing chemotherapy, 18-year olds versus 55-year olds, etc. At the risk of belaboring the 
point, studies touted by weight loss advocates show a correlation between health problems and 
BMI, but in looking closely at the correlational statistic, one finds that 91 percent of the health 
outcomes in these studies have nothing to do with BMI (Burgard 43).  
Arguably, fat studies would not be the burgeoning field it is today if science had proven 
both that overweight alone (a high BMI for instance) causes chronic diseases and early death, 
and dieting helps people lose weight. Instead, countless studies (see especially scholars Glenn 
Gaesser, Paul Campos, and Eric Oliver) show that weight is not the key factor in mortality rates 
or even in chronic diseases, such as diabetes and heart disease—in fact, being overweight 
appears to provide health benefits (Gaesser 96-107). Major issues with obesity research include: 
1) confusing correlation with causation (the studies cannot possibly isolate weight from other 
variables), 2) exaggerating small risks (for instance, a risk may have doubled from 5 people in 
every 100,000 people to 10 people in every 100,000 people, but in both cases, the risk remains 
miniscule), 3) excluding segments of the data to produce a result (without manipulating their 
data, some of the largest and most frequently cited studies show a correlation between increased 
fat and lower mortality rates), and 4) conflicts of interest (studies are funded by weight loss 
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clinics and others whose livelihood depends on an ‘obesity epidemic’—curious readers please 
see especially Campos 3-54 for an in depth study and analysis). Moreover, the best estimates 
show that between 80% to 95%—likely much closer to the latter—of diets fail (Gaesser 39). 
Because they fail, Americans yo-yo diet. Oprah Winfrey remains the most famous example, but 
these collective habits have spurred a $66 billion-per-year diet industry (Marketdata Enterprises), 
yet sadly resulted in increased weight gain and ill health effects (Gaesser 153-180, Campos 25-
34). It is indeed possible that the yo-yo dieting many fat Americans undergo is itself producing 
the ‘increased health risks’ attributed to being fat.  
It does not require a scientific study to realize that thin people are not necessarily 
healthier than fat people and that eating fatty, sugary foods and remaining sedentary—not 
weight—cause health problems. However, instead of a basic fact of genetic diversity, weight has 
become a stand-in for health, as if fat people must be eating sandwiches “with Krispy Kreme 
donuts instead of buns” (West 74) and “reaching directly into [people’s] wallets,” draining the 
country of its health care dollars (Gay 124). By framing fat as an individual health problem, the 
fat woman becomes a scapegoat that distracts us from structural inequalities and deep-rooted 
cultural contradictions about consumption in a capitalist society.   
Both fat and thin people exist. Even Hippocrates wrote about the former. My thesis 
project does not answer the question about why Americans have gained weight (they’ve gained 
an average of twenty pounds since the 1970s); instead, it asks why society cares so much. After 
all, if fat were simply a medical issue, similar to a disease like multiple sclerosis or cerebral 
palsy or even alcoholism, then it would be deemed cruel to openly stare at, taunt, threat, 
intimidate, lecture, pity, or otherwise try to eradicate fat people the way we do; if fat were simply 
a medical issue, we would take our discomfort underground, as we have done with disabled 
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bodies. It should more than raise eyebrows that America has openly declared war on a basic fact 
of embodiment, one that disproportionately affects women, non-whites, and poor people—and in 
the name of national health. At the risk of simplifying a complex issue, women’s studies, black 
studies, and disability studies exist because of a consensus among academics that being a 
woman, black, and/or disabled is not wrong. Who would—at least publically—argue with that? 
Many, however, will argue that fat is wrong.  
 
The False Promises of the Thin Body  
 
“My name is thin. And I am the queen of this prom called life. . . It wasn’t until I was thin 
that I realized just how badly I was being treated when I was fat, and just how overlooked 
I was . . . Fat equals lazy and lacking and less than. Thin equals ‘no, really, after you.’”  
- Jasmine Singer in Always Too Much and Never Enough   
 
Elna Baker, a thirty-something performance artist, shared her story of weight loss on a 
2016 episode of “This American Life” broadcast on National Public Radio. A bright and hard-
working recent graduate of New York University, Baker wondered why prospective employers 
and would-be boyfriends never called. After losing 110 pounds in less than six months and going 
“from one human to another,” Baker realized: “it was all because I was fat.” This New Elna, as 
she called herself, kissed sixteen men in eight weeks. Within a month of losing the weight, she 
nabbed a job on the David Letterman Show. Instead of staring or hurling a derogatory remark, 
strangers now smiled and acted helpful. Baker complicates this seemingly triumphant personal 
narrative, though, when she confesses how she achieved—and maintains—the weight loss: by 
taking speed and enduring four painful surgeries to remove the extra skin from her body. Baker 
questions if “killing off old Elna” was the right thing to do, and she worries that the diet pills 
might harm her over the long term, but she also recognizes: “I need to stay thin so I can get what 
I want,” though “I know . . . how messed up it is.”  
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Thin people—and attractive women in general—are indeed treated better than fat people. 
They are hired more often, paid more, garner higher teaching evaluations from students, receive 
better care from doctors, and are less likely to be bullied in school or abused by their partners 
(see studies cited by Wann xviii – xxi and Royce 151-155). Losing weight appears to mitigate 
this discrimination, at least for the woman with the resources to pull it off, but ambivalent weight 
loss stories like Baker’s demonstrate the high costs involved to one’s health, wellbeing, wallet, 
and sense of security. Fat memoirist Jasmine Singer, for example, feels “traumatized” by her 
fatness (176), and that feeling does not suddenly dissipate after she loses weight.  
Are thinner people happier? Whether fat or thin, women continue to be judged by their 
appearance and equated with their bodies, always, like Goldilocks, having to find that illusive 
balance between too fat, too thin, and just right. In such an environment, women cannot win no 
matter what they do because society continues to map social meanings onto women’s bodies. 
The too-thin woman, for instance, is called cold, anorexic, a snob, a “skinny Minnie,” stuck up, 
frigid, and she thinks she is better than you. Shifting the meanings will not prevent the mapping. 
Weight loss does not free women from the trap of being seen primarily through their bodies; 
weight loss removes the stigma from one individual but leaves it in place for others (Couser 34).  
Because we think self-transformations will bring happiness, the temptation of a 
makeover, however, remains strong, even for women considered “normal” body size. Cultural 
studies scholar Sara Ahmed problematizes the idea of happiness by arguing that it is not simply a 
good feeling or a trait equally available to all subjects (via the techniques proposed by Weight 
Watchers, for example); rather, happiness inheres in those objects and paths that reify social 
norms and that render invisible the social injustices perpetuated by those norms. Ahmed writes: 
“some bodies more than others”—the white, male, upper-class, American body especially—“will 
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bear the promise of happiness” (45). For Ahmed, happiness means proximity to “happy objects” 
and a particular “orientation toward the objects we come into contact with” (24). In other words, 
certain objects—such as the family photo album or dining table, which promote the family as the 
means to happiness—arrive in our near sphere already imbued with value (21). Through 
socialization, through learning about ‘good taste’ and the correct objects to desire (it is our likes, 
Ahmed points out, that establish “what we are like”), we orient ourselves in the right direction: 
toward the pursuit of happiness as an end, and as a social good, in and of itself (24, 32).  
One happy object that captures the contingency of happiness is the before and after 
photo. As I pointed out earlier, various forms of approbation—smiling faces, positive comments, 
increased career opportunities—accompany thinness. People with privilege are perhaps more 
likely to pursue weight loss because they more likely believe in the “fantasy of a moral and 
middle-class subject as the one who is without habit, who will and can choose insofar as they are 
imagined as free from inclination” (35). It seems that one simply chooses thinness, indeed is 
morally compelled to choose it, because of its association with happiness.  
Like other happy objects, the before and after photo hides the work of happiness. 
Culturally sanctioned ‘cures’ for overweight and obesity—often expensive, painful, ineffective, 
dangerous, and available only to those with disposable income—include juice fasts, commercial 
weight loss centers, liposuction, gastric bypass surgery, and pharmaceuticals. Diet supplements 
containing ephedra have killed people. Despite its dismal track record, dieting practices continue 
undeterred, and the diets that do not fail must be maintained forever.  
 Fat studies questions this twisted logic and offers a different, but ultimately untenable, 
solution to the problem of the fat, female body: fat-positivity. Fat-positivity means choosing to 
feel good about yourself. To accomplish these good feelings, Marilyn Wann, in her 
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groundbreaking book Fat!So? Because You Don’t Have to Apologize for Your Size!, 
recommends a type of de-programming that begins with coming out as and embracing your fat:  
I know lots of people who’ve conquered their fear of fat. You can face your fears. You 
can dispel that cloud. And you don’t have to change the world to do it. You don’t even 
have to change your weight. You just have to change your attitude. (13).  
 
Many have found this kind of approach empowering and transformative (fat memoirist Lindy 
West), while others, including myself, find liberationist politics problematic (Australian fat 
studies scholar Samantha Murray).  
I argue that the rhetoric of fat liberation relies on the same self-help logic found in diet 
culture: with an act of individual imagination, one can subvert diet culture and embrace fatness 
with pride instead of shame. Like failure to lose weight, failure to achieve fat pride is considered 
a personal failure. One could argue, of course, that fat pride isn’t meant to be practiced alone but 
rather in community, similar to the feminist consciousness-raising sessions of the 1970s, yet fat 
studies requires that you come to the table already liberated. Otherwise, you won’t find a seat. As 
Wann writes in the Foreword to the Fat Studies Reader, if you think that fat people should lose 
weight (ostensibly this would include yourself), or, if you think that thin is inherently beautiful, 
“then you are not doing fat studies” (ix).   
Life is messy and full of ambivalence, though. Samantha Murray, for example, 
underwent weight loss surgery and wrote that her ambivalence about it, as both a feminist and fat 
studies scholar, was worse than the actual surgery. Writer Roxanne Gay also feels ambivalent 
about her body and cannot overcome her own culture, which equates a woman’s self with her 
body. She laments: “I want to change how this world responds to how I look because 
intellectually I know my body is not the real problem,” but  “on bad days . . .  I forget how to 
separate my personality, the heart of who I am, from my body” (149). In fact, most feminist 
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scholars who write about fat (Cressida Heyes, Susan Bordo, Robyn Longhurst) write about the 
painfulness of wanting social justice for fat people while also losing weight themselves. We 
should address this ambivalence not by attacking feminists who continue to diet as ‘traitors’ but 
rather by viewing this ambivalence as a form of resistance in a regime of disciplinary power.   
 
 Theorizing Ambivalence: A Disability Studies Approach 
 
I argue that ambivalence is a legitimate response when living in a society that de-values 
one's embodiment, but ambivalence is undertheorized by fat studies scholars. To fight fat stigma 
and subsequent discrimination against fat people, fat studies employs two key strategies: 1) 
debunk the medical model, which claims that fat constitutes an individual health problem, and 2) 
re-program individuals (and subsequently society at large?) to view fat people as active, 
attractive, and productive—in short, “normal.” Both approaches offer pros and cons. 
Unfortunately, both tend to present a unitary vision of fat identity, one that does not adequately 
account for intersectionality. Both also leave unquestioned healthism and the ideology of ability, 
meaning “the preference for ablebodiedness,” that delimits—through a paradoxical logic that 
values bodily perfection and invulnerability—who qualifies as worthy and human (Siebers 315). 
In an effort to recognize the diversity and ambiguity of lived experience, and in the hopes of 
fostering a more inclusive politics, I highlight ambivalence as a starting point for theorizing fat 
identity. Although a heterogeneous field, disability studies provides several insights that 
illustrate why it is so difficult to attain a positive fat identity when the desire to like one’s body 
co-exists with the desire to fix it.  
Before I turn to these insights, let me recognize in more detail the contributions of fat 
studies scholar Samantha Murray. She criticizes fat politics because it insists the fat body “be 
seen within frameworks of beauty and desirability that appear to be non-normative and 
  13 
subversive, but are in fact reaffirmations of normative frameworks” (161). In other words, fat 
politics still privileges what Murray terms “heteronormative aesthetic ideals” (161). To provide 
an example, actress Camryn Manheim appears on the cover of her 1999 fat memoir, Wake Up, 
I’m Fat!, donning a slimming black bathing suit and sleek high heels, with a hand on her hip and 
a smile on her heavily made-up face. Though she is fat, as that term is socially defined, Manheim 
wants to be seen as if she were thin; she wants to appear sexy. Instead of chanting “traitor” or 
“sell-out,” we should follow Murray’s lead and concede that: 
If you have been denied the opportunity to experience oneself as a ‘normative’ woman, 
being given that chance is seductive, exciting. Even in my anger at these heteronormative 
presentations of feminine sexuality, as a fat girl, I would argue that I nevertheless have 
the desire to experience them (160).  
 
Murray and the many other fat writers she cites embody ambivalence. After all, “how,” she asks, 
“can you completely remove yourself from the discourses that constitute us as subjects?” (159). I 
agree with Murray that we must create space in fat politics for ambiguity, ambivalence, and 
contradiction; however, I want to further theorize this ambiguity by drawing on disability theory.  
 The concept of stigma formulated by sociologist Erving Goffman lends credence to the 
inevitability of ambivalence among stigmatized people, including fat people. Despite its 
condescending and offensive tone, Goffman’s Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled 
Identity remains a landmark text for disability studies scholars because Goffman captures pivotal 
aspects of the disability experience: how one’s disability overtakes one’s entire identity, the 
seductiveness of passing, and the constant need to manage other people’s emotions and 
impressions via one’s performance of disability. Fat clearly constitutes what Goffman calls a 
stigma or spoiled identity —the fat body, hypervisible, supposedly reveals something deep and 
true about the inner self. No wonder young American girls fear becoming fat!  
  14 
Condemned by the larger, fat-shaming culture, the fat person cannot help but feel 
ambivalent about himself. As Goffman explains, because the stigmatized individual “acquires 
identity standards which he applies to himself in spite of failing to conform to them, it is 
inevitable that he will feel some ambivalence about his own self” (106). To put it another way, 
“the standards he has incorporated from the wider society equip him to be intimately alive to 
what others see as his failing, inevitably causing him, if only for moments, to agree that he does 
indeed fall short of what he really ought to be” (7). I find it unfortunate that some fat studies 
scholars hold the stigmatized fat person to a higher standard than what Goffman calls the 
“normals”—they expect fat women to overcome internalized stigma, but they do not expect the 
“normals” to overcome the ideologies, also internalized, that construct them as “normal.”  
On the one hand, fat scholars and activists, such as Murray, are expected to be loyal to 
their “in-group,” their fellow sufferers, and take pride in their differentness as a political strategy. 
On the other hand, Murray cannot help but internalize the sense that there is something wrong 
with her, so she tries to minimize the problems associated with being a stigmatized person in 
society by undergoing weight loss surgery. This dialectic—knowing that the stigmatized status is 
contingent and contextual, yet also believing, on some level, that it is real—must be 
acknowledged in order for fat politics to become truly inclusive. Individuals—even when 
working together in groups—simply do not have the power to permanently overcome ideology. I 
make this point in an effort to assuage the guilt that often accompanies ambivalence, especially 
among social activists. 
The ideology of ableism, in particular, plays into the construction of fat identity as 
spoiled. As previously mentioned, ableism refers to the unquestioned and deep-seated belief that 
we—despite our innate fragility and mortality—can and should perfect our bodies, and that 
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people with ‘abnormal’ bodies—whatever ‘abnormal’ means within the particular culture—do 
not qualify as fully human. Despite dieting’s dismal track record as an effective intervention, and 
despite the fact that the vast majority—seventy-five percent, according to the CDC—of 
Americans are overweight or obese, many Americans continue dieting. Why? A key reason is 
that our society disqualifies fat by portraying it as a disability—that is, a medical and individual 
abnormality to be overcome through talent and willpower. Because fat denigration relies on 
disability, a master trope that is so ingrained in our collective consciousness as itself an 
unquestioned, disqualifying attribute (Siebers 24), it is unrealistic to think that most fat people 
can attain a positive fat identity. Even ‘thin’ people feel fat in our culture, a phenomenon I will 
explore in Chapter 1. Siebers points to the power of disability when he suggests that it has 
become increasingly difficult to “disqualify people as inferior on the basis of their racial, sexual, 
gender, or class characteristics”; however, we express few qualms about disqualifying people 
based on disability (24). Like disability, fat is conceived “as a biological defect more or less 
resistant to social or cultural intervention” (27). A valuable strategy for making fat “normal,” is 
to reject a medical model of fat; however, I worry that this strategy keeps in place disability as 
the master disqualifier.  
In arguing that fat is right because it’s not inherently unhealthy, fat studies scholars risk 
healthism, or the idea that healthy people are worthier human beings. For good reason, fat studies 
rejects the medical model of the fat body as impaired and instead views fat as a cultural 
construction (Solovay 3, PCA website). Indeed, fat stigma in the United States, which began 
around the turn of the twentieth century, preceded any health or medical concerns about fatness 
and reflected instead a burgeoning middle-class and its efforts to define itself in opposition to 
primitive and uncontrolled bodies, meaning the poor, the non-white, and women (Farrell 4-5). In 
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other words, fat became unhealthy because the medical discourse identified fat as a place to 
assert itself and attach an implicit critique of the lower-class.  
The concern with treating fat people as ‘other’ continues today; it is problematic, for 
instance, that some well-meaning feminists who do not identify as fat continue to view fat as 
primarily a health issue, albeit with complex origins. Lauren Berlant, for instance, utilizes the 
heightened rhetoric of “globesity” to underline the issues of stress and exhaustion, especially for 
the poor, within a capitalist system (30, 33). Meanwhile, Susie Orbach reads in the fat, female 
body a psychological imbalance spurred by the pressures of living in a patriarchal society. As 
Marilyn Wann points out, however, “there is no nice, unstigmatizing way to wish that fat people 
did not eat or exist” (xvii). Understandably, then, fat studies scholars defend fat embodiment by 
challenging medical and psychological arguments about the dangers and origins of fat. Clearly, I 
agree with Anna Mollow that it is important to interrogate science, which is never ideologically 
neutral (207), but I also worry, along with Kathleen LeBesco, about using health as the attribute 
that qualifies fat people as OK (78). I suggest that viewing thinness as an ideology instead of a 
quantifiable embodiment minimizes the discursive essence of healthism, allows for a critique of 
health itself, and provides a better model for understanding how diet culture operates insidiously 
in the lives of women and girls, and increasingly of men, regardless of their body size.  
Therefore I offer models of disability, put forth by scholars such as Siebers, Tom 
Shakespeare, and Alison Kaffer, that help us make better sense of fat embodiment. Neither 
univocally stigmatizing nor empowering, these scholars wish to supplement the social model 
with an explicit acknowledgement of the realities and ambiguities of lived experience. 
Shakespeare, for instance, in advocating what he terms an interactional approach, argues that 
“people are disabled by society and by their bodies” (75). He acknowledges the diversity of 
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disability as a category and recognizes that some impairments do cause pain and suffering. Some 
people, including those with chronic illness, do seek and hope for a cure, and these interventions 
are understandable and valid (83). The interaction between various factors—one’s personality, 
support system, and impairment, as well as society’s attitude toward disability and the 
accessibility of one’s environment, etc.—produces disability (78). Fat studies should embrace a 
similar model, one that marries the embodied with the discursive. “Fat,” like “disabled,” is not an 
ontological state but rather inheres in relationships and social contexts. Nevertheless, the body is 
not only a social construction; there are certain immutable facts that come with embodiment. 
Sometimes fat causes pain, diabetes, or difficulty climbing stairs. Like disability, fat 
encompasses a diverse range of experiences. Manheim, the actress-turned-fat memoirist, is a 
different kind of fat than cultural critic Roxanne Gay, who weighs 400 pounds and is “always 
uncomfortable or in pain” (Gay 206).  Finally, other identities—based on race, gender, class, 
sexuality, and disability—intersect with fat and influence the experience of fatness. By adopting 
an interactional approach like Shakespeare’s, we can better understand that not everyone has 
equal access to a positive fat identity.   
Utilizing the insights of disability studies scholarship, I cast doubt on the possibility of 
achieving a monolithic, positive fat identity. By acknowledging ambiguity, I hope to offer a 
more inclusive model not only for fat studies but also for other scholarship and activism based on 
minority groups. My model does not put the onus on individuals to achieve, through an act of 
willpower, imagination, or choice, a positive identity or an emancipatory narrative, but rather it 
acknowledges ambivalence as an appropriate and resistant response within an ableist society. 
Theorizing ambivalence is a necessary project not only for fat studies but also within an 
increasingly medicalized society—all of us, regardless of embodiment, will eventually confront a 
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profound ambivalence, as we cease to see ourselves as what Goffman calls the “normals” and as 
we face new and exciting opportunities to ‘fix’ our bodies and appearance, and by extension, our 
selves. How we collectively make sense of this ambivalence matters politically.  
 
Conclusion  
 
By drawing attention to the culture’s ambivalence about the relationship between bodies 
and selves, fat studies could potentially undermine the gendered logic that equates a ‘good’ body 
with an autonomous self. Central to this task is recognizing a contradiction seemingly inherent in 
Western culture, dating from the mind/body dualism of Plato, St. Augustine, and especially 
Descartes. On one hand, bodies appear as vehicles for the mind, mere fashion accessories, 
colorful appendages. In this view, to invest in one’s body appears foolish and vain. On the other 
hand, Americans spend an inordinate amount of time, money, and mental anguish perfecting 
their bodies. Through a collision of opposites, remarks Siebers, the body becomes “both 
inconsequential and perfectible” (314). Encouraged to perfect their bodies, and yet admonished 
for vanity, women as “women” bear the burden of this contradiction in their embodiment, and 
they suffer because of it, no matter their size.  
Are we our bodies? What is the relationship between body and self? Is there a true body 
to match a true self, or is the true self merely the normative self? I understand the notion of a fat 
self—the idea that a fat (outer) body reveals something true about one’s (inner) self—as an 
invention, a product of what Foucault calls in Discipline & Punish “normalization.” 
Normalization means a system of rewards and punishments that construct a “norm.” Under such 
a system, who needs a king? People will control themselves as they wonder, anxiously, if they 
are normal, good enough, and OK. A prime example of this: our vigilance over calories and diet, 
and our incessant worrying about being or appearing to be fat, both a product not only of 
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fatphobia and thinness as ideologies, but, as Sandra Lee Bartky points out, of femininity. 
Normalization requires deviants, Foucault suggests, as well as a production of knowledge about 
those deviants. The fat woman, like Foucault’s prisoner, homosexual, or madman, is one such 
deviant. Like the prisoner, her life must be examined “from the triple point of view of 
psychology, social position and upbringing, in order to discover the dangerous proclivities of the 
first, the harmful dispositions of the second and the bad antecedents of the third” (252). In other 
words, authoritative discourses like psychology create a ‘species’ of person—the fat woman. The 
production of such knowledge links meaning not to an act, but to a very type of embodiment, one 
that cannot be hidden from the world.  
In the chapters that follow, I read fat memoirs and tweets about feeling fat as both 
symptoms and products of normalization, yet I also find within both a space for ambivalence and  
resistance. In Chapter 1, I analyze the social meanings and uses of “feeling fat,” tracing the 
emotion to cultural ambivalence about consumption and consumerism. In Chapter 2, I examine 
how the genre of the fat memoir authorizes itself during an “obesity epidemic” and what those 
methods reveal about gendered selfhood. Instead of merely indicting these Twitter users and fat 
memoirists for their lack of fat-positivity, I want to emphasize the social situations that give rise 
to these cultural forms. I want to challenge instead of appropriate the rhetorics of liberal 
individualism.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 
FEELING FAT: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF AN AMERICAN EMOTION 
 
In 2015, based on users’ input, Facebook added a “fat” emoticon to its roster of “How are 
you feeling?” options, which included “amazed,” “discouraged,” and “impatient.” The feeling fat 
emoji featured a double-chinned, red-cheeked smiley face, an image that angered the body image 
activist group Endangered Bodies. The group launched a Change.org petition urging Facebook to 
delete the fat face because, as Endangered Bodies member Catherine Weingarten explained, it 
“mak[es] fun of people who consider themselves to be overweight.” Weingarten, a college 
student who spearheaded the petition in the United States, argued that “fat is not a feeling” but 
rather “a natural part of our bodies, no matter their weight.” In response to the controversy, 
Facebook kept the emoticon but changed “fat” to “stuffed.” With or without the emoticon, 
however, Americans still feel fat. In addition to the dozens of recent articles in the mainstream 
press, a Google search on “feeling fat” results in hundreds of thousands of hits. 
Weingarten’s argument rests on a contradiction that reveals the complexity of feeling fat. 
In a paradoxical fashion, Weingarten dismissed feeling fat as a legible emotion: “as someone 
who has struggled with and overcome disordered eating,” she wrote on her petition page, “I 
know what it’s like to ‘feel’ fat.” Weingarten protested the feeling precisely because she 
experienced it; she then attempted to deny the idea of feeling fat by re-routing it to a medicalized 
body. Long the province of anorexics and others with diagnosed eating disorders, feeling fat 
connotes pathology. Indeed, Northwestern University psychologist Renee Engeln found that 
ninety percent of college women engage in fat talk, despite only nine percent of them being 
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overweight. Feeling fat, it seems, differs from actually being fat—or, to use the medical 
terminology, overweight, a condition defined today chiefly through Body Mass Index charts that 
link one’s height to a medically appropriate weight range. In a 2015 New York Times article, 
Engeln warned readers that feeling fat may lead to eating-disordered behavior. Because it 
normalizes body shame and imbues fat with moral meaning, the social phenomenon of feeling 
fat concerns and saddens many of us, myself included. 
I suggest, however, that to treat feeling fat as an ersatz emotion or individual pathology 
forecloses a discussion that would historicize feeling fat and shed light on emotions more 
generally. Feeling fat—conceived as an emotion, an approach hitherto unexplored by scholars—
mediates the relationship between self and society, inside and outside, the embodied and the 
discursive. I argue that, like any emotion, feeling fat serves an ideological as much as an 
expressive function, one inscribed on the body. Neither wholly physiological nor solely 
discursive, the emotion of feeling fat points to the complex ways that human beings embody 
cultural norms.  
In this essay, I identify the situations that give rise to feeling fat and explore the social 
meanings and functions of the feeling by analyzing fifty tweets with the hashtag “feelingfat,” 
posted during a three-month period in 2017. I suggest that, by feeling fat, the feeler situates 
herself as not fat; she confirms her commitment to slenderness via a neo-confessional post. 
Integrating extant scholarship on emotions, docile bodies, and the cultural history of fat, I 
suggest that these “feelingfat” tweets keep in circulation a disciplinary regimen of self-
monitoring. Feeling fat marks the female body as striving toward an unattainable ideal, implicitly 
white, male and middle-class: the controlled body permitted the occasional good time. As a 
discursive practice, feeling fat shows how the simple act of eating continues to be a fraught task 
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for many women. More importantly, by locating emotion in the collective, social body instead of 
solely the individual, this paper makes possible a feminist critique of feeling fat. Interpreted here 
as a tool for social control, the emotion of feeling fat reinforces normative femininity and 
buttresses existing social hierarchies.  
 
The Problem: Feeling Fat as Personal Pathology 
 
Even a cursory glance at popular culture shows that many American women feel fat. 
Bustle, an online magazine geared toward millennials, declared in 2016 that “most people, 
especially women, have uttered some derivative of ‘I feel so fat’ . . . in their lifetimes” (Ospina). 
Moreover, in one of the 7,000 YouTube videos that address feeling fat, YouTube personality, 
Kaitlyn, remarks to her 23,000 subscribers: “I would suggest that when you’re feeling 
particularly gross and fat . . . that you stop looking in the mirror. I’m not going to say ‘stop 
feeling fat’ because I think that’s unrealistic” (“When You Feel Fat”). Recent print headlines 
include: “Can Facebook Make You Feel Fat?” (Men’s Health), “10 Tricks to Beat a ‘Fat’ Day” 
(Prevention Magazine), “7 Helpful Ways to Cope with ‘Feeling Fat’” (Psychology Today), “Fat 
Days: How to Think Yourself Thin” (Women’s Health & Fitness Magazine), “‘Ugh! I Feel Fat!’ 
Does it Seem like Every Conversation You Have with Your Friends Comes Back to Your 
Body?” (Seventeen Magazine), “What it Means to Feel Fat” (New York Magazine), “I Feel Fat: 
How to Instantly Feel Better in Your Body” (Huffington Post), “I Wasted Decades Feeling Fat 
and Ugly” (Salon), and “The Problem with ‘Fat Talk’” (The New York Times). Noting the 
ubiquity of the phenomenon, two therapists co-wrote a children’s book in 2016 entitled Mirror, 
Mirror on the Wall: Breaking the ‘I Feel Fat’ Spell. Author Michael Alvear, likewise, titled his 
2013 book about sex and body image Not Tonight, Dear, I Feel Fat. Readers of this essay have 
surely overheard or perhaps thought—after an extravagant lunch with coworkers, at a dress 
  23 
fitting with (thinner) friends, or while flipping through the latest celebrity gossip magazine—“I 
feel fat.”  
Regrettably, the above-cited articles find the solution to the problem of feeling fat in the 
individual and not society at large. Should women love their bodies as they are or perfect their 
bodies via weight loss? The answer, almost always formulated as an individual choice: both. 
Suggestions most often proposed include: weigh yourself less often, substitute a different word 
for fat, such as “sad” or “ashamed,” take a walk, or start a gratitude journal. Oprah Winfrey, 
America’s most influential yo-yo dieter, also individualizes concerns about weight. In January 
2017, she ran a large headline on her magazine cover, titled “How Oprah Made Peace with 
Food.” In the article, Winfrey advises that “the deepest care must ultimately come from your 
own self-acceptance.” However, when the issue hit newsstands, Winfrey announced a forty-
pound weight loss and attributed it to Weight Watchers—a company in which she owns shares.  
Feminist philosopher Susan Bordo, on the other hand, suggests that pathologies reside not in the 
individual but in the larger culture; the latter authorizes and in fact incites the obsessive practices 
that make anorexia legible, for example (15). Confronted with this paradoxical message to slim 
down and stop hating their bodies, American women discipline their bodies in increasingly 
nuanced ways, which include feeling fat.  
The emotion of feeling fat—an embodied experience conditioned by larger social 
institutions—challenges the individual paradigm. The common view of emotion as personal, 
subjective, private, and unavailable for public scrutiny obviates the political critique that would 
accompany a sociocultural view, which locates emotion not only in the individual but also in the 
collective, social body. As feminist philosopher Alison Jaggar points out, emotions are not only 
“historical products, bearing the marks of the society that constructed them,” but also constituted 
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in such a way as to maintain and perpetuate hegemony (396). After all, how can individual 
women, such as Weingarten, choose to stop feeling fat when the Centers for Disease Control 
warns that two-thirds of Americans are overweight or obese, when former U.S. Surgeon General 
C. Everett Koop calls our expanding waistlines “grotesque” and harbingers of early death (Loar), 
and when the government ranks obesity a bigger threat to America than terrorism (Pace)? In the 
United States alone, concerns about health—and social status—fuel a $66 billion weight loss 
market (Marketdata Enterprises). In this social environment, one is compelled to feel fat.  
Academic discourse, especially feminist scholarship, paves a path out of the individual-choice 
cul-de-sac by acknowledging that the systemic oppression of women—not individual 
pathology—creates the phenomenon of feeling fat.  
Surprisingly few scholars outside of psychology, however, write about feeling fat. Let me 
briefly discuss two exceptions. In her examination of female shame in contemporary literature, J. 
Brooks Bouson provides a cogent, but ultimately incomplete, analysis of feeling fat. Bouson 
equates feeling fat with fear of fat. Drawing on feminist and fat studies scholarship, Bouson 
argues that women internalize fat-phobia; to feel fat is to feel ashamed (106). However, perhaps 
because Bouson limits her study to two literary representations of fatness (a novel about an 
anorexic woman and a fat memoir), she overemphasizes the shame aspect. In certain contexts, as 
I will show, feeling fat expresses not shame but rather pride in one’s social status as not-fat. 
Next, working in the field of geography, Morgan Windram-Geddes supplies a useful case study 
of feeling fat among Scottish girls in Physical Education classes. Like Bouson, Windram-Geddes 
links feeling fat to fear of fat, this time “result[ing] from encounters with the tangible and 
discursive spaces of physical education underpinned by contemporary obesity discourse” (48). 
Both Bouson’s and Windram-Geddes’ work, then, points to the contextual nature of feeling fat, 
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an insight I build upon by examining the feeling within a social media context. Although Bouson 
and Windram-Geddes offer the plausible interpretation that feeling fat denotes fear of fat, I 
complicate this interpretation. In a social media context where people publicize feeling fat, the 
feeling serves as a method for asserting one’s social status as well as resolving—at least for a 
few minutes—competing social narratives about consumption.   
In this study, I analyzed around fifty tweets with the hashtag “feelingfat” published in 
February, March, and April of 2017. More than 300 million people visit Twitter each month, 
mostly via mobile devices such as cell phones. Because of its embeddedness in everyday life, 
and the seeming spontaneity of tweets, Twitter gives an unparalleled glimpse into the myriad 
meanings of feeling fat, as well as the situations that give rise to such a feeling. These public 
declarations of feeling fat complicate both the pop cultural view and the existing scholarship on 
feeling fat and prove untenable the equation of feeling fat with either personal experience or with 
monolithic social construction. My approach marries the physiological with the social, in the 
same way that disability studies scholar Tobin Siebers melds the social and medical models of 
disability in his concept of “complex embodiment,” which stresses the relational and “mutually 
transformative” interaction between body and society (325). In analyzing the tweets, I consider 
feeling fat a genuine emotion, and I draw on scholarship about the myriad functions of emotion 
in society—physiological, social, and ideological—to explain what feeling fat does in the social 
media space. By eschewing the standard view of emotion, that is, by accepting feeling fat as a 
feeling compelled by American society instead of solely an individual sensation, this essay opens 
up the possibility of a feminist analysis. Weingarten correctly implied that power relations—
specifically the cultural denigration of fat people—leads to the body image issues inherent in 
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feeling fat. However, the solution to social injustice is not to discount feeling fat but rather to 
take it seriously as an emotion.   
 
The Solution: Feeling Fat as an Emotion 
 
In this section, I walk the reader through a series of positions on the nature and function 
of emotion. By applying each theory to the emotion of feeling fat, I complicate and amalgamate 
the extant scholarship, ultimately rejecting the standard view of emotion as solely personal, 
interior, and bodily and instead emphasizing the relational, contextual, and ideological functions 
of emotion. As I will show, emotions act like keys to a social map; they tell us how to interpret 
situations, and they reveal what matters in society. Feeling fat offers a particularly rich site for 
showcasing how emotions often work as social tools that remind us who we are and keep us in 
our place, yet we have some wiggle room to resist these norms even as we perpetuate them.    
 
Figure 1. Tweet from Twitter User #1 
  
 
Figure 2. Tweet from Twitter User #2 
 
 
Figure 3. Tweet from Twitter User #3 
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Figure 4. Tweet from Twitter User #4 
 
 
Figure 5. Tweet from Twitter User #5  
 
At first glance, it would appear that feeling fat entails a physical sensation: feeling full, 
bloated, or lethargic. Twitter User #2, for instance, feels fat after eating fast food at McDonald’s, 
and Twitter User #3 feels fat after eating two donuts. As Facebook contended in my introduction 
to this essay, feeling fat might simply mean feeling stuffed. The presumptive view of emotion, 
which locates emotion inside individual bodies, supports such a reading. In his influential 1884 
essay, “What is an Emotion?”, psychologist and philosopher William James argues that emotion 
causes the bodily disturbance—an increased heart rate or sweaty palms, for instance; he claims 
that emotion is the bodily response, so that “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we 
strike, afraid because we tremble” (67). James writes, “Whatever moods, affections, and passions 
I have are in very truth constituted by, and made up of, those bodily changes we ordinarily call 
their expression or consequence” (70). For example, the subject perceives an object in her 
environment (a charging elephant) and experiences an innate physiological reaction (a rush of 
adrenaline); this sensing of the body’s response constitutes the emotion (fear). A crucial 
corporeality, then, defines James’ view and gives support to an interpretation of feeling fat as an 
interior sensation.  
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James complicates this model, though, by revealing that cognition of some sort, however 
dimly conceived, plays a role in emotion. “Bodily changes,” he suggests, “follow directly the 
PERCEPTION of [an] exciting fact” (67). Emotions, then, are about something—our 
interpretation of that something determines the emotional response. If James sees a man pointing 
an arrow at his head or reads a bad review of his work, he “can perceive in it intent or animus. 
That is the emotion-arousing perception; and may give rise to . . . bodily convulsions in me” 
(71). James shows here that human beings respond emotionally to objects by appraising them. In 
other words, one must register the charging elephant, ostensibly as a threat, before feeling the 
bodily changes that constitute fear. Nevertheless, the body appears to James as a reverberating 
sounding-board, and “no shade of emotion, however slight, [is] without a bodily reverberation as 
unique” (69). If, as James claims, “a purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity” (70), 
then for feeling fat to qualify as an emotion, it must correspond to a physical and interior 
sensation. Ostensibly, a Facebook user would choose the “feeling fat” emoticon not to make an 
insulting statement about fat people but simply because she feels bloated.  
An explanation of emotion rooted primarily in physiology, however, elides the relational 
function of emotion within society. Let us take anger as an example. To explain anger to 
someone unfamiliar with the concept, one might begin by describing physical sensations: a 
flushed face, increased heart rate, and pursing of the lips. The physical manifestations of anger, 
however, vary in intensity and from person to person. One quickly finds that a description of 
anger’s physical symptoms reveals very little to the interlocutor, who surely wants to know, 
indeed needs to know in order to understand anger, what these sensations mean. Not 
surprisingly, Aristotle defined multiple types of anger—spite, scorn, insolence, and contempt—
not in terms of their physical profiles but rather by explaining the situations and relationships 
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that give rise to each kind (7-9). Similarly, to explain feeling fat as feeling bloated, full, or 
stuffed, reveals very little about what feeling fat actually means in American society.  
Locating feeling fat primarily in physicality, then, offers an incomplete view of emotion. 
If feeling fat referred solely to physical sensations, few feminists and other activists would find it 
so troubling. People use emotion words not only to describe interior states, but rather to interpret 
behavior and especially to communicate judgments (Bedford, 210, 214). Writing in the mid-
twentieth century and influenced by the linguistic turn, philosopher Errol Bedford asserts that 
“being angry is logically prior to feeling angry”; in fact, “being angry does not entail feeling 
angry [or] any other feeling” at all (209). In other words, one cannot choose the word anger 
without “first understanding what it is to be angry”: the situation of having been wronged (208). 
Likewise, the Twitter users above cannot choose feeling fat without understanding the situation 
of having eaten too much of the ‘wrong’ foods. No Twitter users felt fat after eating a tub of 
broccoli or multiple helpings of tofu with brown rice. Consuming only particular types of food 
and drink—McDonald’s, brownies, beer, etc.—elicits feeling fat. Clearly, emotions contain 
assessments that evoke standards of evaluation; if they did not, then, as Bedford claims, “to 
explain behavior by using them would not give the insight that it does” (216). To hate the taste of 
eggs, for instance, and yet to hope for their appearance at brunch defies logic; the word hope 
implies that what one hopes for is favorable. To see oneself as striving for and valuing 
slenderness, and yet to feel fat after participating in activities that ostensibly lead to slenderness, 
such as eating wholesome foods or working out at the gym, also defies logic. The word fat 
implies an unfavorable assessment of recent behavior, an unfavorable assessment socially 
understood and agreed upon.  
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Like any emotion, then, feeling fat depends on social context. Advancing his conceptual 
viewpoint, Bedford notes that emotions pack quite the linguistic punch: “in using [them] we are 
able . . . to relate behavior to the complex background in which it is enacted, and so to make 
human action intelligible” (216). In this model, emotions latch onto, in fact are defined by, the 
relationships and situations that they illuminate; the context matters. The ‘bad’ behaviors in the 
above tweets—eating too many desserts or enjoying a meal from Pizza Hut—revolve solely 
around eating. Interestingly, other behaviors that might lead to weight gain, such as sitting at a 
computer for eight hours a day, or binge-watching the latest Netflix series, do not provoke a 
feeling of fatness.  
In addition to social context, one’s position within that context matters. Positionality 
delimits the emotion of anger, for example, as Americans may discount the putatively irrational 
anger of the stereotypical ‘angry black woman,’ or, as in the Western tradition, privilege the 
emotional authority of men’s anger over women’s, which may appear frivolous. Because fat 
constitutes a social stigma, a Twitter user who is fat—acknowledging here that being fat always 
depends on who else is in the room—most likely feels ashamed in mainstream American culture 
and would post no tweets that drew attention to her food consumption or body size. 
Despite popular belief, the Twitter user who feels fat expresses not shame but a socially 
sanctioned embarrassment for having splurged. One feels embarrassed by situations out of one’s 
control or by one’s mild transgressions: fixable, relatively meaningless, or short-lived (Bedford 
212). On the contrary, to feel shame one must feel, at least on some level, at fault vis-à-vis the 
social context that erects the taboo being transgressed (212). Shame implies a transgression so 
deep that it collapses one’s sense of self. To be shamed is to be silenced, shunned, and deemed 
unworthy of social connection—a terrifying prospect for a social being. Why would a woman 
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feeling ashamed about her eating publicize her transgression on Twitter for potentially the entire 
world—her parents, coworkers, partner, students, neighbors, that old flame from high school—to 
view, comment on, and potentially punish her for? The answer: she wouldn’t.  
Although we cannot know empirically the body size of Twitter users who profess feeling 
fat, we can assume that their bodies fall within a perceived “normal” range. In her study of fat 
talk among teenage girls, anthropologist Mimi Nichter found that overweight girls, unlike their 
thinner counterparts, do not engage in fat talk (i.e. “I’m so fat,” “No you’re not!”) because they 
do not want to draw attention to their weight (51-52). Likewise, as many first-person accounts 
show, fat women do not typically advertise their eating or their fatness because it invites censure 
and harassment; in fact, fat women often report fear of being ‘found out’ in the act of eating.1 In 
a culture that excoriates fat people and that finds fat bodies disgusting, only Twitter users 
positioned as not fat—as that term is socially defined—may feel fat. Positionality determines 
who can—at least publically—feel fat.  
*** 
 
 
Figure 6. Tweet from Twitter User #6 
 
                                                      
1 For example, Jasmin Singer, in her memoir Always Too Much and Never Enough, writes that she prefers to eat in 
solitude and privacy, but one day a friend wants to eat breakfast with her. While the friend leaves to get a paper 
towel, Singer quickly consumes her entire breakfast. When the friend “saw that I was taking my final bite of my 
enormous meal, she stopped cold in her tracks—I had been caught . . . I was . . . mortified. It was as though she had 
caught me masturbating” (87).   
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Figure 7. Tweet from Twitter User #7  
 
 
Figure 8. Tweet from Twitter User #8 
 
 
Figure 9. Tweet from Twitter User #9 
  
In discussing feeling fat, and in categorizing as “not fat” those who may publically 
declare such a feeling, I risk capitulating to extremes: either entrenching fatness in ontology or 
negating the body altogether. Inspired by the insights of Michel Foucault, anthropologist 
Catherine Lutz provides the most useful model of emotion for explaining feeling fat in that her 
model mediates these extremes. Instead of untangling the conceptual knot about physical versus 
cognitive components of emotion, Lutz conceives of emotion not as a personal state but as an 
“index of social relationship,” “an ideological practice,” and “a way of talking about the 
intensely meaningful as that is culturally defined, socially enacted, and personally articulated” 
(143-144). Emotions, in other words, are not internal, natural, precultural, or universal; one 
cannot translate “feeling fat” without understanding the meaning of fat in American culture, the 
social norms about the body, and the many ideologies and contradictions that inform the 
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American ethos more generally. Like “fago,” an emotion Lutz studies on the South Pacific island 
of Ifaluk and translates as “compassion/love/sadness,” feeling fat reveals a certain way of seeing 
the world. Lutz suggests, then, that emotions serve “complex communicative, moral, and cultural 
purposes” (144). Anger, for instance, “evokes in the listener of shared cultural background . . . a 
complicated scene with actors, actions, and interpersonal relationships” (146); like anger, feeling 
fat communicates, and also concretizes, social meanings and norms.  
These #feelingfat posts likely provide a sense of shared community, a space for women 
to assert their commitment to femininity in a way that engenders a sense of belonging. 
Participating successfully in ritualistic and patriarchal practices—purchasing beauty products, 
reading women’s magazines, learning how to flirt, and engaging in other forms of “girl talk”—
creates solidarity among women, but it also sets the rules of group membership. Nichter, for 
example, views fat talk among teenage girls “as a performance in which group solidarity and 
personal identity are negotiated” (48). Girls not only bond around fat talk, but they also show 
vulnerability, hence avoiding accusations of being stuck up (55). A girl who engages in too much 
fat talk risks annoying others and being perceived as fishing for compliments; one who never 
disparages herself, though, appears to be bragging (52-56). Girls at either end of the spectrum—
overweight or underweight—particularly suffer in these social situations because they cannot 
participate in the social discourse of fat talk; otherwise, peers will accuse the skinny girl of 
anorexia. Like the fat girl, she too must avoid drawing attention to her weight via fat talk (57-
59). Feeling fat might be a way of forging group ties but also of policing social groups so that 
members’ bodies stay within an acceptable range.  
Feeling fat illuminates, then, not individual pathologies but rather reifies the stringent 
societal norms for women’s bodies. Emotions, as Lutz explains, “orien[t] us toward things that 
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matter” (144). Twitter User #7, for instance, feels fat when she sees a photo of herself thirty 
pounds lighter, and Twitter User #9 feels fat when surrounded by “beautiful, fit, skinny people at 
the gym.” The above tweets point to things that matter (at least for the segment of American 
society represented by these tweets): namely, the size of a woman’s body in comparison to other 
women, to men, and even to one’s own body in the past. Like any emotion, feeling fat also 
orients the feeler in a certain way, in this case, toward a desire to stop feeling fat. Lutz remarks 
that “the calling up of a scenario by the speaker of emotion words is done in particular contexts 
for particular ends, to negotiate aspects of social reality and to create that reality” (147). In other 
words, to use an emotion word—to tweet #feelingfat—“is an attempt to characterize and to move 
events, not merely or even mainly to map them” (147). Numerous tweets about feeling fat 
include statements that reaffirm the feeler’s commitment to slenderness. Twitter User #8 writes, 
“ate/drank way too much this weekend. Need to work it off this week.” By feeling fat, she 
situates herself as not fat, while also motivating herself to take actions that will prevent weight 
gain in the future. On this view, feeling fat implies merely a momentary lapse in judgment, 
corrected by going to the gym more often or by beginning a new diet. Clearly, these Twitter 
users are never ‘off the hook.’  
On the other hand, posts about feeling fat betray an ambivalence about feminine norms. 
Feeling fat provides a socially sanctioned space in which to deviate from the attainment of bodily 
ideals while also maintaining commitment to those ideals. In other words, feeling fat gives 
certain women an ‘out,’ a way to engage in the prohibited behavior of splurging while 
ideologically distancing themselves from its connotations. If one feels fat after eating a box of 
cookies, then one has deviated from the norm, but she has done so safely because her identity as 
a non-fat woman remains intact—after all, she feels fat afterward. In some ways, feeling fat 
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allows the feeler to have her cake and eat it, too. Posting a #feelingfat tweet still re-produces 
feminine norms about consumption, though, even as it offers a very narrow and circumscribed 
space in which to temporarily stray from those norms.    
Emotions are often tools for social control. Because emotions construct reality, it is 
important to note that American culture discourages “negative” emotions, prizes cheerfulness in 
women, and reads anger in a woman with power as “bitchiness.” Feeling fat—and emotions in 
general, which often communicate gendered norms of behavior and thereby naturalize gender 
differences—constitutes a form of what Foucault calls disciplinary power. In Discipline and 
Punish, Foucault describes an historical shift from the straight-forward ‘top-down’ power 
structure of a monarchy to a more modern form of power under capitalism, a power which is 
decentralized, diffuse, subtle, invisible, and seemingly more enlightened, but in actuality, more 
insidious. This “relational power,” as Foucault explains, “is everywhere and always alert” (177). 
For instance, although no single power figure outwardly ostracizes fat women in our culture, and 
although ‘polite’ society often employs euphemisms for fat, such as chubby or plump, 
disciplinary power constructs fat identity as abject and incites (not represses) a cultural obsession 
with fat; this guarding against becoming fat is what makes feeling fat possible.  
Feeling fat is an example of disciplinary power because the feeler is complicit in her own 
subjugation—this is the efficiency and genius of disciplinary power. No one, for example, 
coerces these Twitter users to publically lament that brownie they ate after lunch. The 
democratization of the Internet—anyone with access can sign up for her own public platform—
appears progressive, even freeing, but the constant status updates, the publications of one’s 
‘likes’ and ‘dislikes,’ and the careful curating of one’s family photos, imply the opposite. Under 
disciplinary power, people police themselves as they wonder, anxiously, if they are normal, good 
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enough, and OK. Social media contributes to and keeps in circulation this paranoia. Modern 
discipline, then, controls bodies and minds not through overt methods like torture but, rather, via 
a “new micro-physics” of control that aims to make subjects more useful, productive, and docile 
(Foucault 139). Emotions, such as feeling fat, create docile bodies—bodies “subjected, used, 
transformed and improved” (135). Feeling fat moves the feeler in a certain direction: toward 
fitness, tightness, control, and continued self-interrogation.  
American society engenders the emotion of feeling fat through techniques of micro 
power. Intimate moments in American life—participation in certain scenes and movements 
through certain spaces—give rise to feeling fat, whether a fleeting sensation of dissatisfaction or 
a humming of hope for a thinner future. The following Twitter users, for example, feel fat when 
trying on—or merely seeing—clothing. 
 
 
Figure 10. Tweet from Twitter User #10 
 
 
Figure 11. Tweet from Twitter User #11 
 
 
Figure 12. Tweet from Twitter User #12  
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The enclosed space of the dressing room, the segregation within department stores of plus-size 
clothing, the general unavailability of stylish clothing for young, fat women (hence, Twitter User 
#12 feels “like a whale” at the H&M store), and the inconsistent and not standardized system of 
women’s sizing all create for women a general atmosphere of surveillance and fear. What if I 
can’t fit into these jeans? What will it say about me as a person? Feeling fat, then, arises not 
inside of an individual body, but rather when that body encounters cultural ideology materialized 
in the structures of everyday life.  
 
The Result: Feeling Fat as a Discursive Practice 
 
Diverse and seemingly unrelated discourses—fashion, religion, self-help, and 
psychology, among them—have interacted in such a way that they produce the fat subject (like 
Foucault’s homosexual, criminal, or madman) as a distinct identity. As American Studies scholar 
Amy Erdman Farrell puts it, fat in American culture means “lazy, gluttonous, greedy, immoral, 
uncontrolled, stupid, ugly, lacking in will power, primitive” (34). Moralizing fat isn’t new nor 
inevitable. Peter Stearns, in his cultural history of fat, notes that not until the turn of the twentieth 
century did middle-class Americans imbue fat with moral meaning and consider fat people with 
disgust (3). Far from a fashion fad, the hegemony of thinness established at the turn of the 
century has continued unabated, and largely unchallenged and unchanged (Stearns xx). 
Explaining, briefly, how thin first became ‘in’ situates feeling fat within an historical context and 
introduces contradictions central to the lives of modern American women, contradictions that 
make feeling fat possible. In this section I argue that feeling fat constitutes a discursive practice, 
a way of marking one’s self as not fat, meaning a good middle-class citizen.  
Tweets about feeling fat reveal a cultural ambivalence about consumption, an 
ambivalence rooted in the history of fat in America. Historian Hillel Schwartz, in his seminal 
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study on diet culture, attributes Americans’ obsession with dieting to their ambivalence about 
indulging. He explains the newfound concern with weight at the turn of the century as “the 
modern expression of an industrial society confused by its own desires” and “intimidated by 
abundance”; diets, he writes, “harbo[r] an implicit program for coping with abundance and 
excess in the body politic” (5-6). More recent histories of fat, by both Stearns and Farrell, 
support Schwartz’ analysis. As Stearns suggests, at the turn of the century, the country 
transitioned from an agricultural to an industrial economy. During this age of surplus, when the 
amount of food and leisure increased, window shopping first captured the imagination. 
Meanwhile, religious jeremiads that warned against a consumerist, pleasure-seeking society lost 
their cultural power. In short, middle-class society grew more permissive and indulgent—
through increased consumerism, relaxation of sexual standards, a decrease in religiosity, and a 
perceived decline in the American work ethic (48-70). To compensate for their more indulgent 
lifestyles, while still indulging, and to find an alternate way—besides sex, religion, and work—to 
prove their morality, Americans dieted (57). In other words, guilt and ambivalence spawned a 
crusade against fat because the new imperative for enjoyment and pleasure clashed with older 
Victorian ideals about delayed gratification and restraint (Farrell 44). It was in this context that 
fat became, as one magazine put it, “almost a crime,” and the first attribute one noticed about a 
person (Stearns 22). Like dieting, feeling fat on Twitter disowns and yet also calls attention to 
and indeed provokes indulgence.  
The middle class policed itself—and continues to police itself—by policing body size. 
Like a member of the nouveau riche, Farrell explains, “a thriving, upwardly mobile person 
needed to demonstrate those aspirations by controlling the wealth and abundance that came with 
an improvement in class status; and a fat body revealed an inability to handle that new wealth” 
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(27). A burgeoning middle class required a method for separating the worthy citizens from the 
less worthy, and body size—an attribute highly visible, difficult to change, and associated with 
‘lower’ people—supplied such a method. In her cogent analysis of science and popular culture, 
Farrell suggests that prevailing ideas about race, civilization, and evolution in the late nineteenth 
century advanced a racialized and gendered teleology in which civilization—via the perfectible 
body—marches toward the ideal: the white, male European. Fat, in various discourses, including 
the scientific, became associated with the abnormal, or a ‘lower breed’ of person such as the 
infamous Sara Baartman, or “Venus Hottentot,” a slave from South Africa displayed in England 
and later Paris because of her (to Europeans) abnormally large buttocks. The culture of fat 
denigration, Farrell convincingly shows, depended upon race and gender hierarchies, a 
dependence that continues into the present day (59-81). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 13. Kale meme. “I’ve Eaten More    Figure 14. Ashamed meme. “I’m  
than Enough Kale this Week to Justify     Gonna go Ahead and Count Putting  
Destroying my Body this Weekend,”     on my Jeans as 15 Minutes of Cardio,” 
Someecards, Copyright by Someecards.                      Someecards, Copyright by Someecards.  
 
The historically-rooted contradictions inhering in a culture that encourages unabashed 
consumption while also celebrating self-control help to explain how feeling fat functions. 
Somewhat paradoxically, given the pleasure that food provides, instead of  
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embracing with their bellies a land of plenty, middle-class Americans have exercised self-
sacrifice via the dinner table. Only out of such a culture of overabundance, notes Susan Bordo, in 
which those with power have more than enough to eat, emerges an ideology of self-control 
(192). Drawing on the work of Robert Crawford, Bordo argues that the contradictions between 
production and consumption, inherent in advanced consumer capitalism, create an internal battle 
within the self, one etched on the body and never wholly resolved (186). As producers, we must 
repress our desire for immediate gratification and instead value hard work and sacrifice. As 
consumers, however, we should indulge our every whim, reveling in and pursuing our desires for 
more. Figure 13 demonstrates a shared cultural understanding of this dichotomy, one the viewer 
surely recognizes: being ‘good all week’ so that one ‘earns’ indulgence on the weekend (only 
women who are not fat, of course, earn such indulgence; Figure 14 shows a plumper woman 
covering her face in shame). To be respectable, the modern, middle-class body must show 
mastery over desire, via dieting and other disciplinary measures, but one cannot show too much 
mastery either, which leads to being uptight, pathological, and not a good consumer. One must 
fall somewhere between restraint and indulgence, able to enjoy a slice of pizza or two but 
without eating the whole pie. Feeling fat signals, authorizes, and keeps in circulation this drama 
of appetite, this battle between the producer and consumer sides of the self.  
The burden of resolving, at least symbolically, the culture’s ambivalence about 
consumption falls heavily on women’s shoulders. Women especially, Bordo suggests, must 
perform a precarious balancing act. They must care about their appearance, but not too much as 
to appear trivial or narcissistic. They must monitor and control their weight but not so severely 
that they become anorexic. Somewhere between anorexia and obesity—but much closer to the 
former—lies the right body, one that symbolizes the traditionally masculine attitude of 
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willpower, energy, and endurance (195). Precisely because the culture places moral value on the 
slender body (and by extension the regulated self, one that conquers its hungers and urges), 
Twitter users post the following messages: 
 
Figure 15. Tweet from Twitter User #13 
 
 
Figure 16. Tweet from Twitter User #14  
 
 
Figure 17. Tweet from Twitter User #15 
 
Figure 18. Tweet from Twitter User #16  
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The authors of these tweets cannot take unmitigated pleasure in food—or, if they do, they must 
immediately disown such publically unacceptable, female pleasure. One way to disown such 
pleasure is to feel fat after eating the offending foods, thereby neutralizing the threat of having 
‘splurged.’ As I have shown, feeling fat marks the subject as firmly between material and 
symbolic poles: anorexia and obesity. Because feeling fat balances the cultural compulsion to 
consume and the personal responsibility not to over-consume, feeling fat marks the self as a good 
middle-class citizen: someone who is not fat but cares enough about her body to feel fat after 
indulging; someone who values slenderness enough to make (future) sacrifices but also allows 
herself to enjoy abundance in limited quantities—whether chocolate on a “cosy Sunday night” 
(Twitter User #14), a pancake breakfast (Twitter User #16), or a “rolo Easter egg” candy 
(Twitter User #13).  
Feeling fat is a disciplinary practice that produces a feminine body and mind and 
reproduces normative femininity. Drawing on Foucault’s conception of the docile body, Sandra 
Lee Bartky suggests that women’s bodies—through institutions but also through daily practices 
unbound from institutions—undergo a coercion and a disciplining that produce a particular mode 
of feminine embodiment (448). From facial expressions and manners of speech to the way 
women exercise and even stand, women perform femininity under the gaze of a “panoptical male 
connoisseur”; they live in a constant state of visibility, experiencing their bodies as seen by 
another (454). To Bartky’s “specific repertoire of gestures, postures, and movements” that 
reproduce femininity, I add the emotion of feeling fat (449). Iris Marion Young argues that 
women throw like girls, not because of some biological defect, but because they imagine and live 
their bodies as confined in space (151). Culture creates the female body. Feeling fat, likewise, 
molds a female body and mind attuned to appearances—not only physical attractiveness, but also 
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the dreaded appearance of letting one’s self go, even for one meal, for one moment, for one bite. 
Dieting, Bartky explains, “disciplines the body’s hungers” (449); so, too, does feeling fat. 
Feeling fat, like putting on makeup, constitutes a discursive practice: “femininity as spectacle” 
(454). The feeling itself is a spectacle; it must be tweeted and shared. Again, positionality 
matters. Anyone can feel anger, but not everyone—owing to her positionality—can make a 
spectacle of it. Similarly, anyone in our fat phobic culture can feel fat, but only certain people 
can moralize the feeling through a public spectacle: people who fall within an acceptable range 
of body size (not fat, but also not too thin), women much more so than men, and likely middle-
class people. Because of the limitations of Twitter (we cannot know for certain the demographics 
of any user), further intersectional research is required to more fully address this issue of 
positionality.   
Numerous pop culture sites testify to the disciplining of female bodies through practices 
such as feeling fat. For instance, in the 1995 comedic film Clueless, Alicia Silverstone plays 
Cher, a spoiled but good-hearted Beverly Hills teenager who lives in a mansion, chooses her 
wardrobe based on a computer program, and negotiates rather than earns her grades. Cher 
confesses to her best friend, Dionne: “I feel like such a heifer. I had two bowls of Special K, 
three pieces of turkey bacon, a handful of popcorn, five peanut butter M&Ms and, like, three 
pieces of licorice.” Intended as a parody about privilege, Cher’s obsessive accounting of her 
consumption mimics many tweets about feeling fat. Although men also tweet about feeling fat, 
and though they too suffer pressure to conform to increasingly unattainable body ideals, little 
boys do not typically count calories together nor would a TV show that featured a father and son 
eating copious amounts of food spark much interest (as did the conspicuous consumption of the 
Gilmore Girls in the early 2000s). Feeling fat is a method for regulating female hunger and, as in 
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the movie Clueless, a symbol of one’s status and privilege—only people with more than enough 
to eat can feel fat.  
 
Conclusion 
Instead of claiming, against all evidence to the contrary, that one cannot possibly feel fat, 
this essay took the feeling seriously in an attempt to illuminate the social and cultural functions 
of emotions more generally. Analyzing tweets with the hashtag “feelingfat,” I revealed the ways 
in which women who do not identify as fat nevertheless internalize, and keep in circulation, 
gendered norms about eating and body size. I have argued here for a complex understanding of 
feeling fat. On the one hand, feeling fat orients the feeler in a certain way: toward not feeling fat 
in the future. Feeling fat also neutralizes the threat—to one’s self and to others—of having 
‘splurged.’ Finally, because only the not-fat can publically feel fat, and because of fat’s historic 
association with lower-class people, feeling fat in venues such as Twitter serves as a middle-
class status symbol. I did not purport in this essay to explicate the phenomenon of feeling fat for 
all people or in all cases; however, by focusing on tweets—that is, purposeful and public 
declarations of feeling fat on social media—I emphasized the sociocultural aspects of emotion 
and showed how feeling fat reproduces normative femininity. As Bartky recognizes, mastering 
femininity may make a woman feel competent and confident. In the end, though, this sort of 
competence keeps women as a group oppressed (457, 460).  
Because people who tweet about feeling fat are not fat by normative standards, their 
tweets often invoke a comedic, silly, or fun-loving tone, which elides the pain that millions of 
other women feel each day living in a culture that ties their personal worth to their appearance. 
Only certain people, in other words, have the luxury of feeling fat publically.  
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Tweets about feeling fat position certain types of people as worthy and good (or not), 
insofar as they pursue the same happiness projects; these tweets create a certain kind of solidarity 
and recognition which may feel pleasurable. Hey, we all slip at times. Hey, we all secretly know 
this is kind of ridiculous, but we’re all in this together, so it’s OK. However, the tweets also 
promote a familiar, future-oriented ideology about progress, one that advocates self-sacrifice and 
echoes religious stories about saved sinners and healed bodies, one that offers a comforting story 
about control (i.e., “I’ll get on track tomorrow!”). Sara Ahmed suggests that the promising nature 
of happiness—that it “lies ahead of us, at least if we do the right thing”—constitutes happiness, 
so that even disappointments do not invalidate the promise of happiness (29). Likewise, Foucault 
reminds us that an individual’s progress, what he calls “exercise,” never ends. He writes, 
“exercise, having become an element in the political technology of the body and of duration, 
does not culminate in a beyond, but tends towards a subjection that has never reached its limit” 
(162). Thinness—with its myriad connotations of happiness—offers a mythic goal, an 
unattainable ideal. In a society where one can never be too rich or too thin, women will continue 
to feel fat.
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CHAPTER THREE: 
 
AUTHORIZING THE FAT MEMOIR: 
SELF-HELP, TRAUMA, AND THE TECHNIQUES OF GENDERED SELFHOOD 
 
A 2016 article in The New York Times, part of a series on “The Science of Fat,” 
demonstrates the fundamental mistrust of the fat person’s first-person authority in American 
culture. In the article, reporter Gina Kolata shares the results of a study that, though proving what 
most fat people already know (diets do not work for long-term weight loss) nevertheless 
“shocked the researchers.” Despite their best efforts, thirteen of the fourteen contestants from 
Season 8 of the reality weight loss TV show Biggest Loser regained weight, and four regained all 
their weight and more. “Dieters are at the mercy of their own bodies,” Kolata explains, “which 
muster hormones and an altered metabolic rate to pull them back to their own weights.” Biology, 
confirms Dr. Rosenbaum, and “not a pathological lack of willpower,” makes it difficult to lose 
weight. To what the medical establishment terms this “frightening and amazing” news, the 
contestants reacted strongly, though not uniformly: “it’s not as dramatic as being told you have a 
disease, but it’s along those lines,” said Sean Algaier, who gained 150 pounds after the show 
ended. Amanda Arlauskas felt absolved: “I could tell something wasn’t right with my body,” she 
said. “I just knew it was an issue with my metabolism.” So many readers felt compelled to 
respond that the Times published a separate article consisting solely of reader comments such as 
these: “at least we have persuasive medical evidence that being overweight is a disease rather 
than a moral failing,” “as someone who has struggled with weight almost all of my adult life, I 
can’t help but wonder if I am losing a fighting battle,” and “so can we stop our cultural tendency 
to fat-shame people now?” (McDermott). In a society that has medicalized the fat body, science 
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plays a powerful role as arbitrator of fat and potential vindicator of fat people. Science, it seems, 
speaks for fat people.  
In a climate that denigrates fat people and cedes epistemic authority to science, how can a 
fat memoirist speak for herself? Within the Western tradition, women have long been associated 
with irrationality and emotionality, at odds with the purported objectivity of positivism (Jaggar 
495), and since the turn of the twentieth century fat women in particular have signified lower-
class laziness and primitiveness, pathology and excess, bodies and minds unable to cope with the 
modern cornucopia (see cultural histories of fat by Peter Stearns, Amy Farrell, and Hillel 
Schwartz). By the late twentieth century and with cooperation from the weight loss industry, 
increasing concern about the health risks and costs of a ballooning populace galvanized a war on 
“obesity,” a condition which became and remains a national obsession. In 2003, during what 
became known as the “obesity epidemic,” the mainstream media mentioned “obesity” 7,000 
times, compared with 3,000 mentions in the year 2000, 500 in 1990, and less than 100 in 1980 
(Saguy and Riley 876). That contemporary cultural products—TV shows like My 600 Pound-lb 
Life and films such as Shallow Hal—represent fat women as abject (when they are represented at 
all) is not surprising. Like Michel Foucault’s homosexual, the fat person has become a species, 
primed for dissection and designed for typology, a deviant ‘other’ that through its otherness 
creates the ideal self.  
To gain traction and market share in a mainstream culture in which prejudice against fat 
people comprises “one of the few acceptable forms of prejudice left” (Hartley 65), stakeholders 
in the fat memoir face a formidable challenge: how to make credible and appealing the personal 
stories of fat women, or to put it another way, how to authorize a genre. Fat memoirist Lindy 
West points out why fat women need authorizing: “fat people are [seen as] helpless babies 
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enslaved to their most capricious cravings. Fat people do not know what’s best for them. Fat 
people need to be guided and scolded like children” (14). I argue that, one way or another, fat 
memoirists earn credibility within the larger culture by reinforcing a pre-existing norm or 
ideology. For example, precisely because the culture values health as a moral good, science that 
doubts the purported link between weight and morbidity offers to destigmatize “overweight” and 
“obesity”—construed as medical but also moral conditions affecting two-thirds of American 
(Centers for Disease Control). Of course, one shouldn’t have to invoke science in order to 
publish her memoir. One shouldn’t have to cite a study every time she wants to eat an ice cream 
cone in public without harassment, and one shouldn’t have to forego basic medical treatment 
because the doctor insists she lose weight first. In short, we shouldn’t have to defend our 
embodiment, yet this is precisely the political task that marginalized and discredited groups face. 
Scholarship that does not adequately address authorization as a complex but nevertheless 
unavoidable process tends to overestimate the ease by which any one individual can re-write 
cultural codes, yet scholarship that hews strictly to social determinism leaves less room for 
resistance.  
In an effort to address this stalemate, this essay investigates how American writers of fat 
memoirs come to authorship during an “obesity epidemic.” In a medicalized and patriarchal 
society disgusted by the fat, female body, how do these authors claim moral authority, and how 
do their works appeal to a mass audience? Though much scholarship in the field of life writing 
has produced insights about how narratives reify or subvert norms, I am not interested in 
defining a right or wrong narrative, nor in hierarchizing life stories according to their 
emancipatory potential. What interests me are the methods available for authorization and what 
those methods reveal about gendered selfhood. Using recent fat memoirs as case studies, I 
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examine two particular discourses that fat memoirists draw upon to lend themselves credibility 
as fat, or formerly fat, women: self-help and trauma. In detailing the authorizing moves that these 
memoirs make, I demonstrate the assumed link between autonomy and credibility, and I show 
that fat women can assert autonomy but in circumscribed and gendered ways.  
This essay updates research on the fat memoir genre by analyzing recent texts, and it 
complicates the extant scholarship by challenging the assumption that only a fat-positive 
narrative could accomplish the goals of fat studies. Despite the dearth of fat-positive narratives 
within the genre as a whole, some recent fat memoirs demonstrate a productive ambivalence 
about the liberal individual, as well as the meaning of the fat body and its relationship to the self. 
Fat memoirs can potentially question the ideal of autonomy and reveal self-sufficiency as a 
myth. In fact, I claim that a traditional fat-positive memoir tends to reinforce the liberal 
individuality that fat studies repudiates. Drawing attention to ambivalence opens up a space for a 
type of resistance that foregrounds power structures, acknowledges the existence of contradictory 
social narratives, and does not rely on stigmatized individuals to overcome stigma through 
willpower, imagination, and choice, or what I collectively call the “rhetorics of overcoming.”  
 
Introduction to the Fat Memoir  
 
The advent of the fat memoir in the 2000s and its increasing popularity today is not 
accidental nor incidental. Goaded by America’s “obesity epidemic,” spurred by the memoir 
boom of the 1990s, and influenced by illness and disability narratives (what Anne Hunsaker 
Hawkins terms pathographies and what G. Thomas Couser calls autosomatography), the fat 
memoir arrived on the literary scene. Although not writing specifically about the fat memoir, 
Hawkins observes that a shift from memoirs about acute illness to ones about chronic illness—
“obesity” qualifying as the latter—paralleled a broadening definition within trauma theory of 
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what constitutes a traumatic experience (123-124). Given the memoir genre’s strong association 
with trauma in the 1990s (Gilmore 2), the fat memoir quite possibly emerged at the turn of the 
twenty-first century because being a fat woman in America at the height of the “obesity 
epidemic” was deemed traumatic enough to qualify as a public narrative worthy of consumption.   
Ranging in tone from somber and resigned to humorous and uplifting, the fat memoir is a 
first-person, life story, crafted for publication, in which a typically white, middle-class woman 
selects and orders memories into a coherent narrative, thereby imposing meaning on her fat. Like 
any memoir, the fat memoir constructs a causal relationship among events, and its ending affirms 
certain cultural values, such as self-control or authenticity (Bjorklund 159). In her taxonomy of 
autobiographical works about fat, Donna Lee Brien asserts that men as well as women write fat 
memoirs, but men tend to adopt a more comical tone, and their books comprise much less of the 
fat memoir genre overall. This discrepancy reflects our gendered view of the relations between 
bodies and selves. Throughout Western history, women have been identified primarily with their 
bodies and men with their minds (Bordo 5-11). Fat men and women, of course, both suffer in a 
fatphobic society, but the female fat memoirist portrays her fat body as the central component of 
her identity.  
Although I put pressure on the following typology, as a heuristic, I divide the fat memoir 
into three categories: fat-positive (the author remains happily fat), fat-negative (the author 
remains fat but unhappily), and the most popular form, weight loss (the author becomes thin). 
Updating scholarship on the fat memoir to include recent texts, I discuss one memoir from each 
category: Shrill: Notes from a Loud Woman by Lindy West (2016), Always Too Much and Never 
Enough by Jasmin Singer (2016), and Hunger: A Memoir of (My) Body by Roxanne Gay (2017). 
Both West’s (fat-positive) and Gay’s books (fat-negative) touched a nerve within mainstream 
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culture—their books achieved critical and commercial acclaim, making these works particularly 
useful to analyze in terms of methods of authorization. Although not as successful as the others, 
Singer’s book (weight loss) is representative of the genre as a whole.  
Despite fat studies’ commitment to analyzing cultural representations of the fat body, few 
scholars choose the fat memoir as a locus of study. The extant scholarship claims that the genre 
holds promise as a potentially liberating cultural form but, as a whole, fat memoirs reinforce 
negative stereotypes about the fat, female body. Literary studies scholar Elena Levy-Navarro 
criticizes the genre because it employs a normative and oppressive diet discourse that perpetuates 
discrimination against fat people. However, she categorizes Wendy McClure’s 2005 memoir I’m 
Not the New Me a resistant fat memoir because McClure satirizes diet discourse, exposing it as 
“generic, formula, a ritual” (341), or in other words, a performance compelled by the culture. I 
extend Navarro’s work by contemplating other methods of fat-resistance beyond the satire, 
methods that may be more accessible—perhaps the word is publishable—during an “obesity 
epidemic” and within the context of memoir as a commercial product.  
Another model of resistance, fat pride, proves particularly problematic. In her study of fat 
memoirs published between 2003 and 2005, Kathryn Linder bemoans representations of fat 
women as disgusting and diseased and longs for a “resistant and fat-positive memoir” in which 
the “body can be represented as powerful and healthy rather than weak and in need of a cure” 
(221). Linder celebrates as a model of fat-positivity Emmy award-winning actress Camyrn 
Manheim’s 1999 book Wake Up, I’m Fat!. The cover shows Manheim posing for a mock beauty 
pageant, hands on her hip and donning a black bathing suit, high heels, red lipstick, and a tiara. 
As Linder explains, Manheim “chooses to disrupt societal standards of weight and beauty” (232); 
fat becomes not ugly but beautiful. Although I appreciate Linder’s insight that most fat 
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memoirists “refuse their fat bodies as themselves” (222), I worry along with others (Kathleen 
LeBesco, Samantha Murray) that the model of fat positivity that she and others (Marilyn Wann) 
propose succeeds in rescuing the fat female body from abjection but only by creating an ‘other’ 
through its unquestioned assumption of health as “a transparent, universal good” (Metzl 2) and 
beauty as the defining trait of a ‘real’ woman. This model of fat positivity defines women by 
either the health or sexual attractiveness of their bodies, a tired framework that does not 
successfully avert the male gaze.  
On the other hand, I do not deny that identity politics necessarily involves exclusion. To 
assert a self always involves the creation of an other (Moya qtd by Siebers 24), an observation 
that leads scholars wary of identity politics to shun any essentialist formulation of fat identity. To 
minimize othering, I follow Samantha Murray’s lead and highlight ambivalence as a potential 
form of fat resistance. Skeptical of fat acceptance movements, Murray argues that “if we can 
open a space for the ambiguity and contradictions of bodily experience, if we can accept the 
impossibility of a unitary self in fat politics, we can accomplish more than simply attempting to 
‘re-hierarchise’ fat over thin” (162). This essay examines the ways in which fat memoirists 
authorize themselves through the rhetoric of liberal individuality, yet some fat memoirists also 
challenge that rhetoric. Heeding Murray’s call, I find in recent fat memoirs something of value to 
the project of fat studies: ambivalence about the connection between well-behaved bodies and 
autonomous selves.   
 
The Liberal Individual as Authority Figure 
To be a fat woman in America is to be suspect; the culture discredits fat women in 
myriad ways. First, “in a society in which appearance is the primary index of value for women” 
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(Garland Thomson 28), fat women fail as women; they ‘let themselves go’ and therefore forfeit 
the privileges and rewards of normative femininity, such as the admiring male gaze and the 
social status it affords. Second, fat constitutes a health risk in a society that views health as a 
universal moral good and in an age where, as Nikolas Rose, explains: 
hopes, fears, decisions and life-routines shaped in terms of the risks and possibilities in 
corporeal and biological existence ha[ve] come to supplant almost all others as 
organizing principles of a life of prudence, responsibility, and choice (18).  
 
Because she embodies health risks that she could ostensibly mitigate if she chose to lose weight, 
the fat woman fails as a liberal individual. In a different but related point, Tobin Siebers 
suggests that “the fear of pain is often the beginning of oppression” because we assume “a 
painful life is a wrongful life,” a life not worth living (190, 186, 184). We often associate the fat 
body with pain—the physical pain of bad knees and cardiac arrest but also the pain of 
incompetence, the inability to traverse a flight of stairs or play with one’s children. The body in 
pain drains our collective empathetic resources but also our economic ones, as such a body costs 
more money—in health care costs, lost wages, etc.—to maintain. In this scenario, the fat body 
signifies disability because the fat body fails as an able body. Finally, as I explained in chapter 
one, fat people supposedly cannot control their appetites: a fundamental character flaw in a land 
of plenty. The fat woman fails as a moral, middle-class citizen. Take all these harmful 
representations in the aggregate and fat women no longer speak for themselves; doctors, 
psychologists, surgeon generals, dieticians, lawmakers, journalists, and other authority figures 
speak for them.  
Because the culture denies first-person authority to the fat woman, the fat memoirist—
and other marginalized autobiographers—must take special care to authorize themselves. G. 
Thomas Couser defines authority in autobiography as credibility derived not from research but 
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from personal experience and self-identity (73)—what qualifies as authority, then, cannot be fact 
checked but rather changes over time and depends on whom is speaking. Authority, Couser 
claims, “is constrained by matters such as gender, race, and ethnicity” and “may be best viewed 
as culturally negotiated,” “something to be contested and established by the autobiographer and 
others” (75). Because he strikes an appropriately middle path between self-determination and 
social determinism, Couser’s understanding of authority offers a starting point for analyzing fat 
memoirs as gendered, social products—not individual acts. As Diane Bjorklund’s study of 
American autobiographies shows, memoirs reveal the ever-evolving “vocabularies of the self,” 
as an author can only make sense of her life within the context of her own historical moment, an 
understanding constrained by culture (165).  
When Americans from all walks of life began writing autobiographies in the 1820s, 
critics asked the same question they do today: “what, precisely, qualified someone to put before 
the public the story of his or her life?” (Yagoda 67). The answer depends in part on the author’s 
positionality. Autobiography scholar Leigh Gilmore observes that “memoir as a cultural 
formation represents a gendered sphere in which tolerances around nonnormative life stories are 
negotiated” (674). Given the fat body’s association with failure, how do readers begin to tolerate 
the life experiences of the fat memoirist? Memoir scholar Helen Buss provides a model for 
answering such a question; she outlines the formal ways that writer Lauren Slater, as both a 
woman and former mental patient, authorizes herself in her memoirs—that is, how she avoids 
being dismissed and discredited. Like the fat memoirists, Slater must find “a professional and 
public ‘langue’ to authorize her own ‘parole’” (Buss 37), meaning she must appropriate some 
authorizing discourse to effectively communicate the truth of her experience in a way that others, 
especially those with power, will receive. Buss argues that we “need to study the ways in which 
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the form and shape of autobiographical practices are being changed by specific interests of a 
given cultural moment, and by the different subject positions of writers in that moment” (42), a 
task I undertake via the fat memoir.  
Understanding the gendered methods of authorization within the fat memoir genre gives 
insight into our historical moment. Since the 1970s, Americans have lived in a precarious social 
and economic environment (one could term it neoliberalism, late capitalism, or postindustrial 
capitalism) characterized by “the end of the standard job and family”—a time in which 
opportunities for social advancement and mobility have narrowed so that “a sense of personal 
security is anomalous” (McGee 12). You might land a job and a man, but can you keep them? At 
the same time, consumer culture has appropriated and reshaped the politics of liberal feminism 
so that “girls and women are encouraged to empower themselves through consumption practices, 
heightened visibility, and self-improvement” (Weiser 39). In a savvy study of contemporary 
brand culture, Sarah Banet Weiser explains that postfeminism “is often individualized and 
constructed as personal choice rather than collective action; its ideal manifestation, in turn, is not 
struggle for social change but rather capacity for entrepreneurship” (56). In other words, to 
exercise independence and attain empowerment, “each of us [women] has a duty to ourselves to 
cultivate a self-brand” (56). To be published, fat memoirists must engage in such self-branding. 
Anxiety-inducing social instability combines with the cultural milieu of postfeminism so 
that the most accessible avenue for women to become liberal individuals—a vocabulary of the 
self that Garland Thomson calls the American ideal (41)—is through a rhetoric of overcoming, 
and specifically a rhetoric concentrated on the body and emotions. The body and emotions—
healing from a personal tragedy or trauma, conquering or accepting illness, fat, aging, etc.—offer 
women the most straightforward and user-friendly raw material with which to meld a self-
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determining and autonomous self. Perhaps this is one reason why, as Couser shows, the memoir 
boom has really been a boom in disability life writing—writing “about what it’s like to have or 
to be, to live in or as, a particular body—indeed, a body that is usually odd or anomalous” (2). 
Although Couser views the advent of the “some body memoir” positively, in the context of self-
representation and civil rights (4, 7, 11), its popularity also points to the accessibility—and 
shared cultural understanding—of the body as a locus for overcoming, especially for 
marginalized people barred from other kinds of overcoming narratives. After all, who lacks 
access to her body and emotions? 
In the age of the Enlightenment, society automatically conferred selfhood on the white, 
property-owning male—his rights appeared natural. The “other,” though, must always earn the 
designation of liberal self. Today, women often do so by overcoming bodily obstacles and by 
asserting the self through bodily progress—dieting, for instance. In this age of what Nikolas 
Rose calls “somatic individuality,” in which a consumer-citizen can spit in a cup for $200 and 
receive a report in the mail of her ancestry, health risks, and genetic carrier status, bodily projects 
serve as a means of developing subjectivity. “Ethical practices,” Rose writes, “increasingly take 
the body as a key site for work on the self” (18). Women, however, have long managed minute 
details of the body—eyebrow shape, cellulite, varicose veins, forehead wrinkles, thigh gaps, 
cleavage, etc. Women, and increasingly men, track daily calories and the percentage of fat, 
protein, and carbohydrates in their diet. The Fitbit logs their steps each day. In the TV show The 
Marvelous Mrs. Maisel, set in the 1950s, the heroine ditches her housewife routine to enter the 
male world of stand-up comedy, but she still keeps a daily log of bodily measurements—the 
circumference of her ankles, inner thighs, hips, and basically anywhere on her body that she can 
get a measuring tape around (Sherman-Palladino). A docile body reinforces unequal power 
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structures, but, on the other hand, it also offers a sense of mastery and an increase in autonomy, 
especially for women “stuck in a pink-collar job” (Heyes 77-78).  
Fat memoirs reflect and reproduce the constraints and rewards of docile bodies. The 
majority of authors remain fixated on body size. They equate a thin self with an autonomous 
individual, yet it is precisely this correlation that authorizes the genre. Indeed, strident pleas from 
public health officials to halt an “obesity epidemic” telegraph the emergence of the fat memoir as 
a gendered narrative reliant on overcoming the female body that misbehaves and promising in 
return the authority vested in the liberal individual.  
I want to briefly define three specific but interrelated rhetorics of overcoming that  
produce the liberal individual: willpower, imagination, and choice. Willpower means sheer, 
voluntary effort, the ability to control, direct, and apply one’s forces to the project at hand. Good 
middle-class subjects exercise willpower; such willpower appears to originate deep inside 
ourselves, like an inner and renewable resource. We often assume, for example, that people fail 
to lose weight because they lack the willpower to do so. Imagination, on the other hand, means 
asserting one’s individuality by imagining different values and models of living than the ones 
handed to us by culture. The size acceptance movement uses the positive trope of diversity, for 
instance, to re-imagine fat as not unhealthy or immoral but a simple fact of genetic diversity. 
Finally, choice means existing amidst a field of possibilities and producing one’s authentic self 
through the act of making ‘free,’ unimpeded choices. The successful dieter who finds her true 
self in a thin body appears to have made a choice. Fat memoirists utilize these rhetorics of 
overcoming to craft seemingly autonomous and therefore credible selves.  
The rhetorics of overcoming appear to exist in a vacuum, a blank space of possibility, as 
if each of us arrives on the scene vested with equal potential for willpower, imagination, and 
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choice. Willpower, however, depends on social and economic resources—preparing healthy 
meals requires money (fast food is cheap), time (if you’re working 24/7 and taking care of your 
kids, you don’t have time to cook), and access (not everyone can afford to shop at Whole Foods; 
in fact not everyone can get to a grocery store or enjoy the privilege of a kitchen). Willpower 
should be understood as intricately tied to social resources. Likewise, imagination means 
drawing on and re-arranging available cultural resources in the form of tropes, narratives, and 
discourses. The culture and one’s positionality in society delimits imagination; not everyone has 
access to these cultural resources, and not everyone can draw upon them equally or in the same 
ways, a point I will elaborate on shortly. Finally, choice is a convenient and collective illusion 
because our choices depend on our material realities (not our individual ability to choose); potent 
social and economic rewards compel us to make certain choices and forego others.  
Interpreted as a social situation between writer and presumed reader (Bjorklund 16), but a 
situation mediated also by editors, publishers, agents, critics, and booksellers, the fat memoir 
materializes not through a solitary political or artistic act but rather within and through culture, 
which Stephen Greenblatt defines as “a system of constraints” and “a structure of limits” (227, 
228). Like other forms of literature, the fat memoir experiments within this system, but it must 
hew to at least some cultural norms, as “a life that fails to conform at all, that violates [all] the 
available patterns, will have to be dealt with as an emergency” (Greenblatt 229). These norms 
are forms of authorization. The fat memoirist employs the rhetorics of overcoming—willpower, 
imagination, and choice—to assert her liberal individuality and thereby earn credibility within 
mainstream American culture. However, she does so in gender-specific ways.  
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Case Study #1: The Fat-Positive Memoir 
 
“When I looked in the mirror, I could never understand what was supposedly so 
disgusting” (West 68). 
 
In Shrill: Notes from a Loud Woman, journalist and performer Lindy West conceives of 
fat as a positive identity instead of a medical or moral problem, a permanent state instead of a 
permeable boundary one passes through on the way to thinness. Though West hates being fat 
because of harassment, “I also love being fat,” she writes, because “the breadth of my shoulders 
makes me feel safe. I am unassailable. . . I can absorb blows—literal and metaphorical—meant 
for other women, smaller women, breakable women” (77). West achieves this standpoint only 
after analyzing her response to nude fat women, artfully photographed in black and white by 
Leonard Nimroy. She explains, “it was literally the first time in my life that I’d seen bodies like 
mine honored instead of lampooned” (77). Like shock therapy, West exposes herself to fat-
positive blogs until fat, displayed unapologetically, becomes beautiful and a challenge to 
patriarchal beauty standards.  
Marketed on the book jacket as a “feminist rallying cry,” Shrill in some ways challenges 
the logic of the liberal individual. West mocks the rhetoric of willpower (36), and throughout the 
book, she emphasizes the patriarchal constraints on women. In one essay, West actually satirizes 
the rhetorics of overcoming by providing a tongue-in-cheek numbered guide for how to stop 
being shy (34-50). Moreover, she changes her own mind about fat but does not stop there. She 
engages in a very public debate with her boss Dan Savage at the Seattle Stranger who wrote 
articles that mocked fat people. West rebuts him with her own series of articles because, as she 
writes, people like him “talk to you this way until you make them stop” (93). Although the fat, 
female body provides the impetus for the book and acts as a structural backbone, West discusses 
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women’s reproductive rights and the problem with rape jokes in stand-up comedy. Hers is not a 
narrowly personal memoir.  
However, Shrill authorizes itself in a number of ways that illuminate the gendered terrain 
of the fat memoir. First, West appropriates the rhetoric of imagination to authorize her position 
as a fat woman. She writes that “fat people can be competent, beautiful, talented, and proud 
without [anyone else’s] approval” (73). West, then, views fat pride, or what she calls confidence, 
as an individual act of imagination, an overcoming of one’s culture. After looking at Nimoy’s 
photos, West declares: “I wasn’t unnatural after all; the cultural attitude that taught me so was 
the real abomination. My body, I realized, was an opportunity . . . What a gift” (79). When 
people ask West how she found her confidence as a fat woman, she could answer in sixteen 
words, she says, “because there was really only one step to my body acceptance: Look at pictures 
of fat women on the Internet until they don’t make you uncomfortable anymore” (69). Although 
very different from a weight loss narrative, West’s book still posits a before and after. After 
looking at these photos, West liberates herself—at least on a personal level and seemingly once 
and for all—from the negative, symbolic meanings of fat. Finally, the publisher highlights the 
rhetoric of imagination by stating on the book jacket: “Shrill provocatively dissects what it 
means to become self-aware the hard way, to go from wanting to be silent and invisible to 
earning a living defending the silenced in all caps.” Using imagination, the book jacket implies, 
West became “self-aware” and even made a career and a name for herself.  
Who, though, has access to imagination? West’s book along with actress Camrym 
Manheim’s are the two fat-positive memoirs—not self-help books or manuals but actual 
memoirs—that I am aware of, and both involve young, white, heterosexual, highly educated, 
successful, attractive, public individuals. Moreover, as fellow fat memoirist Roxanne Gay points 
  61 
out, West (and also Manheim) is “Lane Bryant” fat, meaning she can still buy clothes at the 
chain store (Gay). In other words, West is not so fat that she cannot overcome fat through 
imagination. Because of their relative success in life and their positionality, Manheim and West 
appear to exercise a kind of autonomous imagination as they flip the cultural meanings of fat.  
Moreover, both Manheim and West wrote funny books. The book jacket describes Shrill 
as “an uproarious memoir” that challenges the idea “that women, especially feminists, can’t be 
funny.” In fact, according to the publisher, “Lindy narrates her life with a blend of humor and 
pathos that manages to make a trip to the abortion clinic funny and wring tears out of a story 
about diarrhea.” Although West promulgates a feminist agenda in Shrill, she couches it in 
humor—an authorizing mechanism in the form of a spoonful of sugar that makes the medicine 
go down. 
West encourages her readers to exercise their own imagination: “The ‘perfect body’ is a 
lie,” she writes. “I believed in it for a long time, and I let it shape my life, and shrink it—my real 
life, populated by my real body. Don’t let fiction tell you what to do” (22). By this standard, the 
other case studies in this essay—memoirs by Jasmine Singer and Roxanne Gay—fail. Singer 
loses weight, and Gay never stops trying. However, instead of blaming the fat person for not 
overcoming fat stigma, I emphasize the social context of these memoirs, as Levy-Navarro does 
when she suggests that fat women might be compelled to confess, but so too are audiences 
compelled toward a certain reaction to these confessions (353). I challenge the idea that fat 
women can “transcend . . . discourses” and “choose their own representations of the self” (Linder 
223, 220), an expectation that burdens marginalized people disproportionately, leads to guilt, 
and, as Samantha Murray suggests, often reproduces instead of dismantles discursive regimes 
(162). Compared to the fat-positivity of West’s book, ambivalence about fat offers a more 
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accessible and potentially subversive starting point because ambivalence challenges the rhetorics 
of overcoming rather than merely riffing on them.  
 
Self-Help as an Authorizing Discourse 
 
Weight loss offers a method of authorization for many fat memoirists because these 
authors can lose weight and speak from thinness instead of fatness, using a language that tacitly 
supports the continued stigmatizing of fat by presenting the thin body as the proper container for, 
as author Jasmine Singer puts it, a “true” and “healed” self (216). This weight loss method of 
authorization ‘works,’ however, in part because readers implicitly understand and respect the 
logic of self-help discourse. In other words, weight loss memoirs draw on self-help discourse 
because it lends credibility to their stories about fat; in a self-help narrative, the body is not an 
intractable fact but rather a playground of endless possibilities. Susan Bordo and Tobin Siebers 
describe this cultural fantasy as one of “rearranging, transforming, and correcting” 
malfunctioning parts, an “ideology of limitless improvement and change, defying the historicity, 
the mortality, and, indeed, the very materiality of the body” (Bordo 245). The past, full of 
“sickness, injury, disfigurement, enfeeblement, old age, and death” gives way to a contradictory 
future, one where humans, through cybernetics, genetics, or just good old fashioned self-help, 
triumph over death, at least for a while (Siebers 8). Every day, in every way, as the mantra goes, 
we get better and better.  
Although rooted in the Enlightenment notion of the liberal individual, self-help literatures 
of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries advance a unique version of the self as 
fundamentally protean. In contemporary self-help discourse, the prerequisites for selfhood 
include an endless capacity to—and a boundless enthusiasm for—self-transformation and 
reinvention. Weight loss and other before-and-after body projects reify these prerequisites for 
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selfhood in a visceral way that makes the promise of self-mastery difficult to resist. The body in 
these narratives becomes a stand-in for the self: mutable and fixable. Of course, the self is never 
really solved and must be continually re-asserted through the pursuit of life projects (a recent 
Samsung commercial capitalizes on this paradox when it declares “we’re born to do what can’t 
be done”). Sociologist of self-help culture Micki McGee sums up succinctly the cyclical nature 
of self-help:  
The resulting contagion of insufficiency constitutes the self-improvement industry as 
both self-perpetuating and self-serving. While the purchase of a commodity—mouthwash 
or dandruff shampoo—was once the route to some sense of interpersonal social security, 
today the simple purchase of a commodity is insufficient: altogether too easy. Instead, 
one must embrace a lifestyle, a series of regimes of time management or meditation, of 
diet and spiritual exploration, of self-scrutiny and self-affirmation (18).  
 
Self-help, then, begets instead of abates anxiety. Futurity is central to self-help discourse because 
the promise of happiness always lies in the future and, in fact, happiness attains its promising 
nature precisely because it is not here now (Ahmed 32). The rhetoric of willpower comes to the 
fore in self-help, as only selves who work hard and long enough enjoy the promise of success.  
In fact, with self-help, willpower never ceases; satisfaction must always be deferred as 
one lives “the effortful life” (McGee 175). At its core, McGee explains, self-help constitutes 
unending, unpaid labor on the self, giving way to what she terms “the belabored self” (177). To 
stay competitive in the job market, to improve their relationships, to achieve health and wellness, 
Americans must work on themselves 24/7. Importantly, the self-help ethos frames success and 
failure on wholly individual terms, re-casting societal problems as personal insufficiencies 
mitigated by mastering the self, charting one’s own course, and being all you can be. It is the 
rhetoric of willpower that appears most prominently in self-help discourse. The rhetoric of 
imagination, on the other hand, recedes. Despite the talk about personal uniqueness and 
authenticity, in self-help the imagination is utilized not to think beyond one’s cultural milieu but 
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rather to create a future hitched to its wagon. Consumers of self-help undertake the same exact 
tasks—make vision boards, recite affirmations provided for them in books, maintain a gratitude 
journal, etc.   
The rise of self-help—the publication of self-help books more than doubled between 
1972 and 2000—corresponds to sweeping changes in the structure of the labor market, as well as 
the success of the civil rights and women’s movements, which made more widely available the 
ideal of the self-made man (McGee 11, 14). Nearly anywhere you look now in the mainstream 
culture—advertisements, TV shows, pop music, political speeches, and of course the fat 
memoir—one finds a self-help narrative. Both a balm and a burden, self-help has captured, and 
one could argue held captive, the American imagination.  
Publishers are likely more willing to publish fat memoirs about weight loss because of 
the demand in today’s marketplace for self-help memoirs. Autobiography scholar Leigh Gilmore 
argues that a redemptive, self-help (she uses the term “neoliberal”) narrative has neutralized the 
threat of non-normative witnesses and displaced the former vitality and inventiveness that 
characterized the genre in the 1990s (86). The “I” of the self-help story, she explains, “recasts 
historical and systemic harm as something an individual alone can, and should, manage through 
pluck, perseverance, and enterprise” (89). The author “transforms disadvantage into value” (89), 
thereby absolving herself for any previous failure.  
Far from a panegyric about 1990s memoir, this essay nevertheless recognizes and 
legitimates Gilmore’s insight that marketable life stories—ones deemed by publishers to be 
legible and consumable by the culture—have narrowed, including within the subgenre of the fat 
memoir. The market domination of self-help and positive psychology books, and the power of 
the Oprah Winfrey brand, speak to the culture’s authorization of stories that eschew critical and 
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historical analysis and instead put the onus on individuals to ‘make good’ in a free market 
economy. Weight loss memoirs appeal to readers because they accommodate such a narrative. 
One might argue that self-help discourse predates the late twentieth century, and indeed it 
does. After all, it was America’s first self-made man, Benjamin Franklin, who wrote the seminal 
American autobiography (first published in 1791): a self-help manual and pedagogical text with 
charts for how to become a middle-class person via daily habits. However, Franklin believed that 
the point of becoming this better person was to do good within a community, to become a 
citizen—this is, after all, the same man who created the library system, the police force, 
neighborhood militias, intellectual associations, and major aspects of the American government 
(Isaacson 459). The ethos of developing oneself for membership within a community is missing 
from today’s self-help memoir. Referring to addiction memoirs, autobiography scholar Megan 
Brown explains:  
Such memoirs reinforce the neoliberal notion that life should be a project in the first 
place—an opportunity for individuals to manage, optimize, and take responsibility for 
themselves. This increasingly commonplace way of viewing everyday life comes with 
potential costs, such as foreclosing desires to foster community and interdependence, or 
further eroding public services and assistance (372).  
 
Self-help discourse, then, draws on larger assumptions about selfhood and how to acquire it in a 
modern society with increasing income disparities, racial violence, and debt and where 
“corporate care and individual self-management replace public assistance and services” (Brown 
361). In such a society, one way to keep the American Dream alive is through self-help 
narratives that feature ordinary individuals ostensibly conquering and thereby creating their own 
selves—the weight loss memoir offers one form of this narrative.  
Let us examine the shape of a typical weight loss story. Katariina Kyrola identities 
several elements common in weight loss TV shows (and, not incidentally, the weight loss 
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memoir). The makeover begins with what Kyrola terms a “start-reveal,” when the audience sees 
the dieter’s fat body in presumingly disgusting situations, such as lounging in public in a bathing 
suit or licking one’s fingers after eating greasy food. A personal trainer or nutritionist (the 
authority figure) confronts the fat person, who feels exposed and ashamed, cries, and then 
commits to purging herself of fat. Because of the nature of female corporeality, Kyrola argues, 
women can never wholly or permanently purify themselves of disgust, but the fantasy of a 
disgust-free body captivates the dieter, and by extension the viewer. A new, less disgusting self 
emerges only after the dieter obsessively tracks her food intake and engages in copious amounts 
of exercise (pathology in certain contexts, but empowering in the TV show). Unlike men, Kyrola 
remarks, women completely reject their former fat selves and cannot recognize themselves in 
photographs; their dieting narrative requires a complete transformation of the self, she suggests, 
whereas the male makeover revolves around his body only. In the “end-reveal,” for instance, the 
female dieter—perfectly styled—looks sexily at the camera. She wears different clothes and a 
better hair-do, and she chats with a new romantic interest or plays a sport she could not play 
before. The dieter and the personal trainer banter like friends—they are now on the same level 
(70-84). Now thin, the fat woman has been vindicated.  
It is important to recognize that the weight loss story—the diet discourse I described 
above—is simply a form of self-help discourse. This is why, despite its utter inefficacy for 
weight loss and the depressing prospect of eating cottage cheese and rice cakes, the cultural logic 
of dieting remains so powerful and so difficult for individuals to let go of. Many of us know 
friends and family members who have dedicated decades of their lives and a large proportion of 
their paychecks and mental bandwidth to dieting. Because it properly situates the fat memoir 
within its historical moment, my analysis of the fat memoir genre interprets weight loss as an 
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authorizing move not only because fat people are abject in our culture but also because of 
dieting’s association with self-help.  
The before and after narrative appears to concretize success by pointing to a fixed 
moment in time and holding it up as a trophy, but really the star of the weight loss narrative is a 
self based on self-help discourse; her body must be forever modified and maintained, as the work 
of selfhood is never done under the regime of self-help. Despite its association with makeover 
culture, the self-help project never ends. The central contradiction of self-help is that one can 
never achieve once and for all a ‘true’ self and therefore always needs more help—help from 
outside the self. Of course, the dark underside of the “before and after” story is that there’s 
always an after after the “after.” A fat memoir that acknowledges this can undermine the logic of 
self-help and the dominant view of the fat body as a problem that can be fixed.      
 
Case Study #2: The Weight Loss Memoir  
 
“I wanted to rip my flesh off my skeleton and put it through a shredder” (Singer 50).  
 
Fat speaks for Jasmine Singer, she explains in her fat memoir Always Too Much and 
Never Enough. A gay, thirty-something animal rights activist living in New York City, Singer 
writes about classmates and strangers calling her names like “fat fuck” and “fat tranny” (63, 
114). Her size attracts bullies, delimits her career prospects, and infuses every setting with 
tension, from the dressing room and family dinner table to high-rise parties and city streets. In 
short, fat defines Singer’s identity; she writes that her fat “follow[s] me around my room, my 
town, my life—never letting me forget” and always “running the show” (60). In fact, when 
people look at Singer, she claims, all they see is fat: “my body spoke for me before I was even 
able to” (324). So that others may see in Singer more than fat, so that others may, in fact, 
actually see Singer, she diets. She discovers juice fasting and loses 100 pounds in two years. By 
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losing weight, Singer can become more than and appear to transcend her body, which increases 
her chances at success in a society that prizes self-transformation and that equates fat with 
laziness and stupidity. Indeed, in a dieting narrative, the body shifts from a “subjective 
corporeality” to “an object, something one inhabits, owns, and molds, not something one is” 
(Kyrola 71); such a story frames dieting as a way to express one’s potential, which suits a culture 
that fetishizes the future. Because she promotes an ideology of progress through a self-help 
discourse, her successful dieting story authorizes Singer to speak publically through her memoir.  
For example, the drama of the reality weight loss TV show plays out in Singer’s writing 
as she continually shifts from the viewpoint of a shamed, future dieter to the authority figure that 
makes sense of it all. Singer, for instance, “imagined heaven” as a Burger King drive-thru where: 
I finally felt genuine. I took a bite of my burger and I was myself. There was no other 
place in my life . . . where I was safer, where I was calmer . . . My stomach and heart 
swelled with satisfaction, and I felt full of life. The irony, of course, is that it was death I 
was full of (42-43).  
 
Only from the vantage point of her future thin self does Singer interpret this happy scene as 
dangerous and shameful. On one hand, Singer speaks sensuously about food and portrays eating 
as a beautiful, nourishing, and even transformative experience: “food was my guru, my lover, my 
sage” (13), “my constant distraction, my unconditional source of love, my trusted confidant” (26) 
“my salvation (33), and “best friend” (27). Singer describes French fries as “the perfect, 
orgasmic combination of fatty, sweet, and salty,” “so succulent” (42), and while eating them, “a 
sense of security and accomplishment spread to my limbs and heart” (27). On the other hand, the 
weight loss authority voice always intrudes to explain the real “overarching issue”: “the foods I 
consumed were highly addictive and unhealthy” (107),  “the . . .  deeper truth was that I was 
addicted” (9), “I have always used food as a way to assuage feelings” (217), and “it could 
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certainly be argued that my attitude toward food . . .  could be thought of symbolically as a 
metaphor for my willingness (or lack thereof, really) to look inside myself with honesty” (187). 
Note how Singer speaks in the third person—“it could be argued.” Perhaps she wishes to appear 
objective, but it is, after all, her memoir. All of us must make sense of the events in our lives 
using the authoritative discourses available; diet discourse authorizes Singer’s memoir.  
About two-thirds of the way through the book, the memoir jarringly becomes not a 
memoir but a self-help guide. In a 500-plus page book, these last 100 pages are an extreme 
departure from the rest of the book in terms of style, tone, and content. The address abruptly 
changes as Singer shifts into the second person, speaking directly to the audience in her new role 
as weight loss authority. With a repetitiveness and appeal to consumerism characteristic of self-
help rhetoric, Singer describes her juicing journey, portraying herself along the way as an 
autonomous agent who, via willpower, achieves slenderness. In this self-help section, time slows 
down. Whereas a chapter in the previous section of the book might cover 5 years of Singer’s life, 
“Days 1-5” of her first juice fast comprise an entire chapter in this self-help section, and “Days 
6-10” comprise another. Singer provides information (types of juicers, how often to juice, what 
fruits to use) to help the reader to undertake a similar journey. Like any diet guru, she includes 
the requisite, results-not-typical caveats. To give the reader a feel for the language in the self-
help section, I offer the following paragraph (emphasis always mine):  
“My decision to go on a juice fast would indeed change the course of my life” (209). “It 
all started with juice” (218). “Juice fasting . . . makes the ‘break’ from eating that much 
more conscious and intentional, giving you more bang for your buck . . . at least it did 
for me” (219). “Detox. That was the name of the game. Not weight loss” (222), but “I 
won’t deny it . . . I was really, really happy [to lose 11 pounds in 10 days]” (238). “As I 
continued on this journey through my first ten-day juice fast,” this “life-altering ten 
days” (237), “I could not possibly have known how deeply and permanently my life 
would change because of it” (226). “It all started with juice” (227). “I hope that 
people will try out juice fasting and find the successes that I have . . . I hope they 
ultimately reclaim their health through the power of juice” (233). “Sometimes the 
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answers are so incredibly obvious. We just have to take the first sip” (252) because 
“just like that, the pounds stayed off, and with each juice fast, more pounds began to 
melt off” (254). “I was in charge” and food “didn’t own me anymore” (254). “I lost 
weight without even thinking about it” (255). “I could get past the finish line if I 
wanted to” (274). “It’s easy to get complacent and ignore the issues in this world . . . or 
we can do whatever is in our power to change it. For me, that shift was not fully possible 
until I first changed myself. I needed to find my truth. I needed to find my juicer” 
(328).  
 
The solution to bullying, harassment, sexual abuse, self-hatred, sexism.: juice. An editor 
or publisher likely asked Singer to add this self-help section to the book as a method for drawing 
an audience. Singer clearly feels ambivalent about this section, though, because she inserts a 
chapter at the end of the book that questions the validity of her happiness as a newly thin person 
and by extension the redemptive self-help narrative (277–294). Singer feels profoundly saddened 
that the world treats her so much better as a thin person, and she feels guilty for still judging fat 
women (286). Struggling to decide if fat is really so bad, she writes, “thin does not necessarily 
equal healthy, and zaftig does not necessarily mean unhealthy” but, “on the other hand, obesity 
can lead to serious medical conditions” (293). Likewise, juicing is not a “moral mandate,” but, 
about shopping for purslane at the farmer’s market, Singer writes, “I felt particularly virtuous 
and wholesome.” (223, 228). Most importantly, Singer wants to accept fat, but yet cannot stop 
dieting:  
Can I shun fat-phobia and yet write a book detailing my journey of losing weight? Does it  
make me a hypocrite to get on my soapbox about how we should be kind, tolerant, 
accepting and embracing of all individuals—regardless of size or species—and then get 
off my soapbox just in time to request my tofu please be steamed and not fried? Can a 
formerly fat person like me hold any weight when it comes to size acceptance? (289) 
 
She offers only a contradictory answer: “I am all for body acceptance no matter what our bodies 
look like, and I think it’s a travesty how fat people and queer people and people of color . . . have 
been, over the years, expected to feel ‘less than’” (291). It is not OK, however, for Singer herself 
to be fat, because she felt sick and as though she were given the wrong body (294), but “I am,” 
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she writes, “to tell the truth, somewhat conflicted about this” (292). Understandably, given the 
culture’s mixed messages about the importance of the body, Singer does not know how to feel. 
The book’s marketing, however, erases this ambivalence, an ambivalence that could be 
politicized.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Before and after photo. From Always Too Much and Never Enough (p. xi), by 
Jasmine Singer, 2016, New York: Berkley Books. Copyright 2016 by Jasmine Singer.  
 
  
The marketing of Always Too Much and Never Enough depends upon a self-help fantasy 
in which autonomous agents achieve their ‘true’ bodies and destinies through willpower. On the 
book’s back cover, Dr. Neal Barnard offers this praise: “Jasmin’s story is an inspiration to create 
your best self and your best life.” Before the story begins, moreover, the reader finds a before 
and after picture of Singer. In the former, Singer looks away from the camera, her legs spread 
out, taking up space; this is a full body shot. In the latter, a close-up, Singer looks directly at the 
camera, holding her glasses in her hand, connoting sexiness and power. The before and after 
photo becomes what Sara Ahmed terms a “happy object” because it spreads the (false) promise 
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of weight loss as a path to happiness. The reader, too, can undertake this journey and overcome 
her fat body. The memoir’s marketing relies on a self-help rhetoric that elides the pain, suffering, 
and ambivalence found within the pages of Singer’s book, pain, suffering, and ambivalence 
which necessarily will continue after the “after,” as Singer works to maintain her weight loss. 
The before and after photo effaces the work of happiness, a work that never ends. 
In some ways, however, Singer challenges the rhetorics of overcoming and casts doubt 
on the logic of self-help. Her memoir does not actually end at the “after.” She reveals the 
sacrifices and continual upkeep required to attain a slender body. To ‘do’ her life and maintain 
her figure, Singer schedules her juice fasts six months ahead of time and makes herself 
unavailable for socializing during these monthly fasts (243). She knows this regimen “might 
seem extreme to some,” but “it’s just what I do” (243). Although portrayed by Singer as a 
personal choice, one made with her partner “in the wake of a falafel-filled night in San 
Francisco” (201), juice fasting becomes a ‘choice’ only because it is authorized by a culture that 
views fat, especially female fat, as a moral issue—and because, as Singer herself recognizes, she 
is privileged enough to choose such a solution. She can afford the expensive ingredients, and she 
has the time it takes to juice. Singer seems to admit that she is not truly the autonomous agent 
starring in her own self-help story.  
Moreover, for most of the book Singer does not constitute a “happy object” but rather 
what Ahmed calls a “feminist killjoy” (59)—a troublemaker who challenges the accepted script 
of happiness. Singer shares traumatic memories of being bullied and raped, and she describes in 
painstaking detail—the kind most Americans go out of their way to avoid—the plight of farm 
animals. Furthermore, Singer challenges the idea of the heterosexual family as a happy object; 
she is a lesbian with a partner thirty years older than her (of course, she doesn’t reveal the latter 
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fact until the end of the book). Finally, the careful reader recognizes that Singer’s weight loss 
does not actually lead to happiness, at least not the kind advertised in the before and after photo. 
She still has days, Singer admits, when she eats too much and feels bad about her sagging skin; 
“the guilt, the fear, and the despair about my relationship with food” are not gone (326). 
Although no scholars would characterize her book as fat-positive, I argue that hers is a voice of 
ambivalence and therefore resistance; she admits the false promise of the before and after photo.  
The book, of course, counters this feminist killjoy affect in several ways. The innocuous 
cover features an illustrated ice cream cone surrounded by sprinkles. The jacket copy makes no 
mention of Singer’s sexuality or her ambivalence about her weight loss; instead, the publisher 
strategically emphasizes how Singer “found herself” through juicing, and how the reader will be 
“transformed” by “the journey.” In order to be read, this memoir dresses itself up as a self-help 
book, a fact attributable not so much to Singer’s individual shortcomings but rather to the social 
situation of the fat memoir and the gendered requirements of selfhood.  
  
Trauma as an Authorizing Discourse  
 
Although different from self-help, trauma provides another authorizing discourse for the 
fat memoirist for several reasons, beginning with its ubiquity, or to put it another way, its 
legibility within mainstream culture. Because of what Roger Luckhurst terms “the affective 
transmissibility of trauma,” we find trauma “across virtually every arena of discourse, whether 
scientific or cultural, professional or amateur, high or low” (119). From psychological studies on 
trauma to the confessional that is Oprah Winfrey’s couch, from Holocaust writing and 
documentaries about Post Traumatic Stress Disorder to Dave Pelzer’s best-selling series of books 
about childhood abuse A Child Called It, trauma narratives abound. In fact, on Amazon, sixteen 
of the top twenty bestselling books under the category “Western U.S. Biographies” are trauma 
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stories—and Pelzer wrote four of them! (“Amazon Best Sellers”). The memoir genre itself, at 
least since the 1990s, has constituted a trauma discourse (Gilmore 2). Not surprisingly, then, fat 
memoirs appropriate trauma discourse, as well.  
 To speak of trauma as a single discourse, however, is misleading; no single field stakes a 
definitive claim on this slippery and contested term (Luckhurst 4). For example, does trauma 
discourse point to the impossibility of narrative, or does trauma discourse seek to reconstitute the 
shattered self through narrative? Trauma studies scholars disagree on the answer. Moreover, 
debates about the physical versus mental aspects of trauma have shaped its history (Luckhurst 34 
- 49). Is trauma a physical, neurological disease, or is it psychological in nature? Arguments 
about trauma parallel arguments about fat—is the obese body a physical disease or a problem in 
the mind? For the most part, popular culture frames both fat and trauma as individual issues, yet 
both remain contested sites where the body and mind intertwine in an impenetrable knot.   
 At its core, trauma is the notion popularized by Sigmund Freud that a traumatic event can 
cause belated symptoms, as the sufferer deals with the trauma but can only do so indirectly and 
subconsciously (Freud 98-100). What makes trauma credible depends on the nature of the 
traumatizing experience. Traditionally masculine experiences of war or the concentration camps 
of the Holocaust offer seminal examples of trauma as an event outside the realm of ‘usual’ 
experience. In 1992, feminist psychiatrist Judith Herman sought to expand this definition of 
trauma to encompass ‘everyday’ experiences, such as sexual and child abuse, and therefore 
widen trauma’s umbrella to include women’s experiences in a patriarchal society. In Trauma and 
Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—From Domestic Abuse to Political Power, Herman 
defines a traumatic event not by its rarity or extraordinariness but rather by its ability to 
overwhelm a person and take over her life, as if the past continually intrudes on the present, 
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producing traumatic symptoms that “take on a life of their own” (34). Symptoms of trauma 
include hyperarousal, or the feeling of always being alert for danger, intrusion, or the re-living 
of the event long after it is over via flashbacks or traumatic dreams, and constriction, or numbing 
and disassociating with the event (33-47). Codified in the definition of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, these symptoms are an important and authoritative facet of trauma discourse, which the 
fat memoirist can draw upon to make sense of her experience in a way others would recognize.  
 Far from monolithic, trauma discourse nevertheless draws on a well-established narrative 
tropes, such as fragments. Literary scholars Cathy Caruth and Shoshana Felman develop an 
aesthetics of trauma that privileges aporias, gaps, fragments, repetition, and non-linearity. For 
these scholars, art mimics the experience of trauma by representing trauma as a breakdown of 
knowledge; art about trauma, then, elides resolution. For instance, Felman defines testimony as a 
discursive practice and speech act, one performed, it seems, only in reference to events beyond 
comprehension: 
Testimony seems to be composed of bits and pieces of a memory that has been 
overwhelmed by occurrences that have not settled into understanding or remembrance, 
acts that cannot be constructed as knowledge nor assimilated into full cognition, events in 
excess of our frames of reference. (5) 
 
The quintessential event “in excess of our frames of reference” is the Holocaust. Felman 
analyzes the poetry of Holocaust survivor, Paul Celan, and concludes that Celan gives testimony 
to this “historic cataclysm” by writing poetry that “dislocate[s] its own language and . . . break[s] 
its own verse” (25). In other words, Celan’s poetry resists narrative closure, and by doing so, 
accurately represents the Holocaust. Likewise, for Caruth, trauma resists narrative because 
trauma holds inside it a paradox: “the truth of an event, and the truth of its incomprehensibility” 
(153). Trauma, she writes, “defies simple comprehension,” and in the act of verbalizing it, a 
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traumatic memory “may lose both the precision and the force that characterizes traumatic recall” 
(153). For these two scholars, only an aesthetics that plays with narrative form can give voice to 
trauma. The “right” and credible way to tell a trauma story, at least for Caruth and Felman, is 
through an anti-narrative narrative—a form well established in Holocaust stories and therefore 
readily available as an authorizing device.  
 The fat memoirist who appropriates trauma discourse represents herself as a liberal 
individual, seeking freedom and emancipation from her past. In trauma discourse, though, the 
rhetoric of willpower recedes and the rhetoric of choice comes forward. The survivor cannot 
overcome trauma through willpower, and she can’t change the past, but she can choose to testify, 
meaning that she can share her story publically. Professor of psychiatry Steven Weine observes 
that our culture treats testimony with “reverential attitudes” because it “possesses qualities of 
emotional intensity, authenticity, morality, and diversity that may be wanting in other parts of the 
culture” (150). To testify is a special and political act outside of ‘normal’ storytelling. As Lynne 
Segal explains, “the fundamental threat, or exhilarating promise, which feminism offers those it 
ignites is that of transgressing the boundaries between public and private” (21). Testifying 
promises a feeling of empowerment and the possibility of social change, both associated with the 
women’s movement of the 1970s. The term “testimonio” makes explicit the connection between 
personal narratives and social change. John Beverly explains: 
Testimonio represents an affirmation of the individual subject, even of individual growth 
and transformation, but in connection with a group or class situation marked by 
marginalization, oppression, and struggle (103).  
 
As a marginalized person, testifying about social problems experienced personally, such as rape, 
can be read by the larger culture as a courageous and civic act, the act of an autonomous and free 
individual. 
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 On the other hand, testifying might de-authorize the fat memoirist. Testimony is highly 
gendered, and women’s testimony is more often discredited and doubted (Gilmore 88). Though 
readers of memoir continue to consume and respond emotionally to trauma narratives, book 
critics and other literary gatekeepers disparage the trauma trend. Drawing on the insights of 
Ralph Savarese, Luckhurst notes that “objections to the narcissism of the ‘misery memoir’ begin 
to appear only once so-called ‘minorities’ begin to use the memoir form as a political device” 
(Luckhurst 124). Likewise, Leigh Gilmore argues that neoliberalism (what I refer to as self-help 
discourse) displaced the testimonies of women and minorities, who drew too much attention to 
the material conditions of their lives in a racist, sexist, and homophobic society. Weine 
acknowledges that testimony exists not in a vacuum but in relation to its particular cultural 
contexts, which mediate the forms testimony takes and the ways it is received by an audience. 
Many people are involved in and manipulating testimony, so that the relationship between 
testimony, authenticity, and social change remains fraught and extremely complex (Weine 147-
153). Sociologist Jeffrey Alexander, in fact, understands trauma not as an individual experience 
at all but rather as a social construction negotiated by and for the benefit of groups (13, 18). In 
other words, trauma is not an ontological phenomenon.  
 I argue, nevertheless, that trauma discourse offers an authorizing device for the fat 
memoirist because of its ubiquity, its association with ‘expert’ knowledge, the masculinity of 
war and other traditionally traumatic experiences, and the ready-made and easily recognizable 
narrative tropes of trauma. In Foucault’s terms, testimony is a compelled confession and a form 
of self-disciplining that creates a space for experts and social institutions to assert power (58-61). 
Yet it is precisely Foucault’s understanding of the neo-confession that gives trauma its authority 
as a discourse. The truth of trauma has already been produced. As I will show in the next section, 
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the fat memoirist can latch onto this truth as a way of explaining her embodiment in a society 
where people demand answers about the fat, female body.  
 
Case Study #3: The Fat-Negative Memoir 
 
“People see bodies like mine and make their assumptions. They think they know the why 
of my body. They do not” (Gay 5). 
 
Roxanne Gay, cultural critic and author of the bestselling book of essays, Bad Feminist, 
published the long-awaited Hunger: A Memoir of (My) Body in 2017. Like other fat memoirs, 
Hunger tells the story of weight gain; the narrator transforms from a size 8 to a size 42. Gay, 
who identifies as a queer, Haitian American, grew up in Nebraska in an upper-middle class 
family. After a group of boys raped her in the woods when she was twelve, Gay “ate and ate and 
ate in the hopes that if [she] made herself big, [her] body would become safe” (21). In other 
words, Gay’s fat body originated with the rape. About the cleaving of a life, Hunger explores the 
messy aftermath of trauma. To her parents’ confusion, Gay gained 120 pounds in high school. In 
the middle of her junior year at Yale, Gay disappeared and traveled the country, often to meet in 
person lovers she first connected with online. Eventually Gay found success and notoriety as a 
writer, but, after thirty years, she thinks about her rapist daily, and she has yet to make peace 
with her body, which, at its heaviest, weighed 577 pounds (291, 23).  
Like Lindy West’s memoir, Gay’s book also offers a feminist critique; she writes about 
the obesity epidemic, reality weight loss TV shows, Weight Watchers commercials, capitalism, 
the impossible beauty standards for women, and what she refers to as the weight-loss industrial 
complex. Whereas Shrill uses humor to disarm its feminism and intellect, Hunger uses trauma. 
The black and white cover of Hunger features a close-up photograph of a fork, each tong 
discernible and each casting a long shadow over the title letters. This ominous and stark cover 
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foregrounds the violent side of hunger, with the fork denoting a weapon. The book jacket copy 
likewise lures potential readers by presenting “the devastating act of violence that was a turning 
point in [Gay’s] young life” as a secret to be discovered.  
In fact, every single aspect of the book’s marketing reinforces Hunger as emotional and 
personal. The subtitle for the book is “a memoir of (my) body.” The first phrase of the book 
jacket copy reads “in this intimate and searing memoir.” Readers go on to learn that Gay “casts 
an insightful and critical eye” not on society but “over her childhood, teens, and twenties” and 
that this book “is a deeply personal memoir.” Gay is deviant in her body size, gender, race, and 
sexuality, but the marketing of the book emphasizes her “wrenching past,” “wisdom,” and 
“bravery.” These strategic choices suggest the gendered nature of the memoir genre. 
Gay defends her fat embodiment—that is, Gay authorizes herself to speak publically as a 
fat woman—not by accepting her body as beautiful (West) nor by successfully transforming it 
(Singer), but rather by attributing fat to trauma. The overwhelming majority of fat memoirs 
include a cause, or what I term an “origin story” about why the author became fat, but unlike 
origin stories in other fat memoirs, Gay’s origin story relies explicitly on the concept of trauma: 
she claims that the rape (the traumatic event) made her fat (the symptom). She reveals her secret 
within the first few pages: “some boys had destroyed me, and I barely survived it. I knew I 
wouldn’t be able to endure another such violation, and so I ate because I thought if my body 
became repulsive, I could keep men away” (13). In other words, trauma caused her embodiment; 
“trauma,” Gay says, “compelled me to create this body” (23). Instead of controlling the body 
through willpower, Gay gives up some control by framing her body as “marked” by trauma (20). 
After the rape, she writes, “my course was set” and “the past is written on my body” (41, 246). 
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Like the so-called obesity gene, one could interpret trauma as a discourse that at least partially 
absolves Gay of her fatness, making her a more likely heroine.   
Gay adopts the trauma discourse in several ways. First, she exhibits in the book the 
hallmark symptoms of trauma. Throughout high school, she writes, “mostly, I was numb. . . I 
was trying to forget what happened to me. I was trying to stop feeling those boys on and in my 
skin” (64). Although trauma psychologist Judith Herman mentions alcohol and drugs as numbing 
agents, Gay eats to achieve numbness: “I was broken,” Gay writes, “and to numb the pain of that 
brokenness, I ate and ate and ate” (22). Gay also experiences intrusion. She writes, “I slept less 
and less because when I closed my eyes, I could feel boy bodies crushing my girl body” (82). 
Even after thirty years, she is still not free of the rape (40):  
I am still haunted. I still have flashbacks that are trigged by the most unexpected things. I 
don’t like being touched by people with whom I do not share specific kinds of intimacy. I 
am suspicious of groups of men, particularly when I am alone. I have nightmares, though 
with far less frequency. I will never forgive the boys who raped me (32). 
 
As the quote demonstrates, Gay suffers hyperarousal around men and strangers who try to touch 
her. Gay’s ambivalence about her sexuality also relates to hyperarousal. She writes, “saying I 
was gay wasn’t true, but it wasn’t a lie . . . I was terrified of men . . . I wanted to do everything in 
my power to remove the possibility of being with men” (236). Being with women, then, helped 
Gay avoid the hyperarousal she felt around men. Gay mentions The Courage to Heal, a 
handbook for sexual abuse survivors that “gave me a vocabulary for what I had been through,” 
she writes (70). Gay explains and makes public sense of her identity through a framework readily 
available to her: trauma.  
In playing with narrative form, Gay’s book appropriates literary tropes suggestive of 
trauma. Sometimes poetic and sometimes an essayistic critique of the larger fat-hating culture, 
the book consists of numbered fragments, ranging in length from a paragraph to ten pages. For 
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instance, fragment number five reads in its totality: “what you need to know is that my life is 
split in two, cleaved not so neatly. There is the before and the after. Before I gained weight. After 
I gained weight. Before I was raped. After I was raped” (14). Hunger rejects a traditional 
narrative plot of a beginning, middle, and end, in favor of simply a before and an after. This 
version of before and after eschews the triumphant narrative of the weight loss makeover 
because trauma does not pretend to end happily ever after. Moreover, because fragment number 
five is so short, the majority of the page it appears on is blank. The blank space suggests silence, 
or the inability for words to adequately convey how the rape ripped Gay’s life apart. Trauma 
resists narrative, according to Caruth and Felman, and Gay’s work fits within this established 
aesthetic. In other words, Gay employs a set of discursive tropes that have come to represent 
trauma—she writes the ‘right’ trauma story in the ‘right’ ways.   
In addition to its structure, Hunger enacts trauma through its repetitiveness. The rape 
returns again and again throughout the book, as if against Gay’s will. Caruth offers that “to be 
traumatized is precisely to be possessed by an image or event” (5). Certainly, Gay’s writing 
reflects such an unwelcome possession; Gay references the rape in nearly every single fragment. 
The ceaseless repetition conveys the intrusive nature of trauma. She writes, “I wish I could bury 
that story . . . but it has been thirty years and, inexplicably, I am still not free of it” (40). Gay 
repeats herself on a sentence level also, which connotes an obsessive repetitiveness, a stalling, an 
inability to move forward. For example, in fragment eight, she writes, “I ate and ate and ate” 
because “I was broken.” Fragment nine repeats the same statement: “I was broken . . . I ate and 
ate and ate” (22). Note also the rhythm of the following excerpt: “My body was nothing. My 
body was a thing to be used. My body was repulsive and therefore deserved to be treated as such. 
I did not deserve to be desired. I did not deserve to be loved” (241). Her writing suggests a sort 
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of trance state, a feeling of being stuck, a circularity. Long after the rape, she continues to be 
nothing more than a body. Gay writes, “My body is a cage. My body is a cage of my own 
making. I am still trying to figure my way out of it. I have been trying to figure a way out of it 
for more than twenty years” (19). Her prose operates by accretion and reads like stops and starts; 
the reader feels trapped inside it. This is an artistic choice that echoes previous trauma literature. 
This prose style suggests Gay’s inability to find any closure, as well as, more generally, 
the impossibility of knowing, which I interpret as a form of ambivalence about the trauma 
discourse. Paradoxes abound throughout Hunger: “I don’t know how things got out of control, or 
I do” (13), “I do not know why I turned to food. Or I do” (53), “I wish I knew why [I went back 
to the boy who raped me]. Or I do know why” (246). The inability to know is a central theme in 
Gay’s book because she doubts if her stories are true or simply constructions, which may be a 
defining characteristic of trauma, but it is also a form of ambivalence and hence resistance to 
dominant authoritative discourses. Herman, for instance, points out that survivors often “tell their 
stories in a highly emotional, contradictory, and fragmented manner which undermines their 
credibility” (1). Gay admits, “my memories of the after are scattered, fragmentary” and while 
looking at photos of herself, she writes, “I try to make sense of how I went from the child in 
these perfect photographed moments to who I am today. I know, precisely, and yet I do not 
know. . . the why still eludes me” (33). It’s not clear if the “why” refers to the rape, or if the 
“why” refers to her fat body. Either way, Gay contradicts herself throughout Hunger, and she 
doubts her own explanations. She questions the logic of trauma discourse instead of merely 
employing it.  
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In trauma discourse, one earns the credibility of a liberal individual by sharing her story, 
by going public, by coming ‘out.’ The rhetoric of choice plays a role here because Gay chooses 
to testify, despite the costs. She explains:  
Something terrible happened, and I wish I could leave it at that because as a writer who is 
also a woman, I don’t want to be defined by the worst thing that has happened to me. I 
don’t want my personality to be consumed in that way. I don’t want my work to be 
consumed or defined by this terrible something. At the same time, I don’t want to be 
silent. I can’t be silent (38). 
 
A radical departure from the weight loss story, the trauma narrative Gay wields nevertheless also 
speaks to a kind of freedom, not the freedom to mold the body at will but rather a freedom from 
shame and secrecy. As the book jacket states, Hunger “tells a story that hasn’t yet been told but 
needs to be.” Testimony, not weight loss, authorizes Gay’s story and gives her credibility. Her 
inability and compulsion to speak—she published essays about the rape, but never told her 
family about it—reflect what Herman calls “the central dialectic of psychological trauma”: “the 
will to deny horrible events and the will to proclaim them” (1). Yet Gay accomplishes the task 
called essential by some and impossible by others: to speak the unspeakable. Writing her 
memoir, she says, was the most difficult thing she has ever done (303); “my sad stories will 
always be there. I am going to keep telling them even though I hate having the stories to tell” 
(251). She appears, then, to sacrifice her comfort and privacy—to do the labor of testifying, a 
labor demanded especially of women—for the sake of the collective good. She explains: “I hope 
that by sharing my story, by joining a chorus of women and men who share their stories, too, 
more people can become appropriately horrified by how much suffering is born of sexual 
violence” (39). Gay cannot overcome trauma—otherwise, it wouldn’t be trauma—but she can 
overcome her reluctance to confess it.  
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Gay is certainly not the first person to explain fat through the lens of trauma—as 
LeBesco and Braziel point out, a plethora of psychology books in the 1990s linked fat to trauma, 
thereby creating what these scholars call a traumatized body (5). In a different but related 
example, feminist and psychotherapist Susie Orbach wrote in 1978 of the fat female body as “a 
symbolic rejection of the limitation of women’s role,” a response (conscious or not) to living in a 
patriarchal society (26, 18). Gay’s memoir lends credence to Orbach’s position in ways that 
would likely disturb fat activists and rightly so. What is at stake in representing the fat body as a 
traumatized body is that such a representation puts forward a conception of fat that leaves in 
place the connection between an outer body and inner self; the fat body becomes not a valid form 
of embodiment but rather a symptom of some deeper, interior struggle (LeBesco and Braziel 3). 
Although Gay’s memoir looks nothing like the fat-positive memoirs celebrated by scholars, she 
nevertheless opens up a space for resistance, but she does so through trauma, a discourse that fat 
studies scholars understandably find problematic. 
I argue that Gay appropriates trauma discourse to authorize the publication of her story, to 
explain her embodiment in a culture that demands such explanations (and in a way that resonates 
with readers as legitimate), yet she does so in a way that presents the fat body as a traumatic 
body. In my definition of the term, a traumatic body is a body marked, defined, and produced by 
trauma, a marking that is visible to all by the very nature of its embodiment. Referring to her 
weight gain, Gay writes: “I did this to myself. This is my fault and my responsibility. This is 
what I tell myself, though I should not bear the responsibility for this body alone” (16). Though 
ambivalent, Gay ultimately attributes the trauma of being raped and the concomitant weight gain 
to a patriarchal society that commits violence against women. She writes:  
All too often, what ‘he said’ matters more, so we just swallow the truth. We swallow it, 
and more often than not, that truth turns rancid. It spreads through the body like an 
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infection. It becomes depression or addiction or obsession or some other physical 
manifestation of the silence of what she would have said, needed to say, couldn’t say 
(45). 
 
By bringing together the discourses of trauma, fat, and gender, Gay challenges dominant social 
narratives about the fat body, which characterize fat as an individual pathology of the body 
and/or the mind. Instead of an “expression of excess, decadence, and weakness” (Gay 122), the 
fat body in Gay’s formulation reflects the material reality of unequal social relations.  
I use the term traumatic instead of traumatized because I mean to draw attention to the 
ongoing trauma that Gay experiences by virtue of being “super morbidly obese” in a fat-hating 
world. As Gay explains, “when you’re overweight. . . your body is constantly and prominently 
on display . . . your body is the subject of public discourse . . . the harassment is constant” (121, 
268). She is “terrified of other people” and worries about taking up space on public 
transportation and wouldn’t dream of eating potato chips in public (173, 146-147). During an 
appearance on her book tour for Bad Feminist, Gay must find a way to get onto a stage three feet 
off the ground, with no stairs. After several minutes of trying to hoist herself up (and in front of 
hundreds of people), another writer manages to pull her onstage. Finally onstage, she sits on her 
chair, and it cracks. She writes: “I threw up in my mouth, swallowed it, and then did a squat for 
the next two hours” (265). Alone and ashamed in her hotel room that night, “I sobbed because 
the world cannot accommodate a body like mine” (266). Even if Gay lost the weight, she would 
never overcome the trauma of once being fat; it wouldn’t go away. In this way, Gay questions 
thinness as the solution to a traumatic body like hers:  
I do not equate thinness with happiness. I could wake up thin tomorrow and I would still 
carry the same baggage I have been hauling around for almost thirty years. I would still 
bear the scar tissue of many of those years as a fat person in a cruel world (301).   
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Gay’s story complicates the politics of fat pride—Gay cannot simply overcome trauma (or fat or 
gender) through willpower and magically feel good about being fat. One discursive set of 
conventions (trauma) disrupts another (fat). Although framed as a personal story, and in some 
ways an overcoming story about testifying, ultimately Hunger casts doubt on the American ideal 
of the autonomous individual in ways that fat-positive memoirs do not.  
Hers is not a triumphant act of imagination like Lindy West’s; Gay cannot overcome her 
shame, not even through testimony, since people doubt women’s testimonies (Gay 247). She 
cannot overcome her culture, since “I live in a world where the open hatred of fat people is 
vigorously tolerated and encouraged. I am a product of my environment” (153). She cannot 
overcome her self-hatred, since she feels a double bind to lose weight and to be a role model for 
fat women: “I hate that I am letting down so many women when I cannot embrace my body at 
any size” (148). Gay’s ambivalence opens up a space for resistance that does not rely on the 
rhetorics of overcoming.  
 
Conclusion   
 
From a glut of documentary films (Fed Up, Super Size Me, Fat, Sick & Nearly Dead, to 
name only a few) to the ever-ballooning diet section at your local Barnes & Noble (The Obesity 
Code, The Fast Metabolism Diet, and the perennially popular Food Rules: An Eater’s Manual by 
Michael Pollan), Americans consume at a dizzying rate answers to the question of the fat body. 
The answers offered include bad genes, metabolism, or mothers; an overabundance of cheap and 
processed foods; the sugar lobby; school lunch programs; the greed and ingenuity of food 
corporations; food addiction; and various psychological issues, such as fear of male attention. Fat 
studies scholars—see in particular LeBesco’s work on the “obesity gene” and Julie Guthman’s 
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analysis of “foodscape” arguments—provide insightful critiques of causes and pose a different 
question entirely: who or what does an etiology of fat serve?  
I frame my analysis of the fat memoir genre in the context of authorization because it 
acknowledges the fat memoir as a social negotiation delimited by larger cultural forces. In an 
effort to implicate all of us in the culture of fat shaming and to create a more inclusive fat 
politics, I stay away from scholarly conversations that characterize (albeit often inadvertently) fat 
women as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending on their individual level of emancipation. In this 
way, I undermine a particular version of identity politics that is based on the very self-help 
discourse that fat studies scholars criticize. To put it another way, I argue that we need to stop 
equating autonomy with credibility.  
The book jacket for Always Too Much and Never Enough hails Singer’s memoir as “one 
woman’s journey to find herself through juicing, veganism, and love, as she went from fat to 
thin.” Along the way, however, Singer starved herself, ingested dubious laxative teas and herbal 
fen-phen, spent twenty years dieting through programs such as Weight Watchers and Jenny 
Craig, and endured one summer of complete abstinence from food, during which her hair fell 
out. Because it ‘worked,’ however, Singer describes juicing as “a healthy obsession” (226), 
though it too requires an enormous investment in time and money and produces physical 
symptoms such as dizzy spells, fatigue, swollen lymph nodes, and having to allow “more time to 
go from sitting to standing” due to lack of calories (222-225). The point here is not to criticize fat 
memoirists for a purported contradictory consciousness but to recognize the value of a genre that 
reveals our cultural assumptions about who can qualify as a liberal self, and the extent we are 
collectively willing to go to earn that qualification. After losing weight, when looking at photos 
of her “rounder face and fuller cheeks,” Singer “can’t seem to find [herself] . . . looking back” 
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(226). Her self is her body, only it is a thin body; this is because the self “is always found as 
close as possible to the normative body” (Paasonen ctd by Kyrola 73). Despite popular belief, 
authentic bodies are not individual achievements found through introspection or the plastic 
surgeon’s knife but rather symptoms of a cultural logic that declares certain bodies more moral 
than others. 
Fat—like black, female, or disabled—is a social construction without any prior, 
ontological meaning, but the social meanings of fat, however contingent, nevertheless affect fat 
women’s lives in profound ways. As for many fat women, for Roxanne Gay becoming fat meant 
losing her self. Gay laments that her parents harass her about dieting and exercise “as if all I am 
is my big fat body” (117). Most people in her life “saw my body before they ever saw or 
considered me” (8). When fat speaks for you, you must find a way to be heard as more than a 
body. This essay explored the gendered ways that fat memoirists employ the rhetorics of 
overcoming—willpower, imagination, and choice—in an effort to be taken seriously as liberal 
individuals. For women, these rhetorics most often revolve around bodies and emotions.  
Unfortunately, whether they’re fat or thin, “hot” or “not,” sexualized or asexualized, women 
remain trapped because they are still seen primarily as bodies. In its current formulation, fat 
positivity often exacerbates instead of solves this problem. Ambivalence about the meaning of 
fat offers a much-needed standpoint, one too often silenced by the authority ceded to science and 
medicine and by the pressure within fat acceptance movements to display fat pride. To be heard 
by the mainstream culture, however, the fat female memoirist must authorize herself. She does 
so by communicating some version of an overcoming story, packaged in gender-specific ways—
a requirement that obscures ambivalence and a requirement that, though fulfilled by some, 
excludes many others.  
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APPENDIX 1: 
FAIR USE AND PERMISSIONS 
I have included images of tweets in this thesis for the sole purpose of scholarly research 
and analysis. The tweets I have reproduced consist of very brief statements about how the 
Twitter user feels—it is unclear if these factual tweets are in fact copyrighted material. 
Moreover, these tweets were originally posted in a publicly accessible location online (on the 
free website Twitter.com) for social networking purposes. I, however, reproduce these tweets in 
an entirely different context, for a different purpose, and for a different audience; I therefore 
have transformed their use. I employ the tweets for the purpose of making a scholarly argument 
about cultural attitudes towards femininity, consumption, and body size. My analysis is for 
nonprofit and research/scholarship purposes and directed toward cultural studies and other 
scholars. I have reproduced each tweet in its entirety because the image of the hashtag 
“feelingfat,” and the emoticons, fonts, and photographs attached to these tweets help to convey 
both the tone and meaning of the tweets, which are crucial to my argument. Finally, my use has 
no effect whatsoever on the market of these tweets or the market of Twitter.  
I have also included two memes in this thesis for the sole purpose of scholarly research 
and analysis. Although the memes are copyrighted material, they were originally posted in a 
publicly accessible location online (on the free website someecards.com) for entertainment 
purposes. I reproduce these memes in an entirely different context, for a different purpose, and 
for a different audience; I therefore have transformed their use. The two memes were not 
originally published in tandem. I, however, have joined them together for the scholarly purpose 
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of illustrating cultural contradictions regarding consumption and self-control. My analysis is for 
nonprofit and research/scholarship purposes and directed toward cultural studies and other 
scholars. I have reproduced the memes in their entirety because the images and the text taken 
together are what supports my argument. Moreover, my use has no effect whatsoever on the 
market of these memes or the market of someecards.com.   
Finally, for the sole purpose of scholarly research and analysis, I have included in this 
thesis a before and after image originally published in the beginning pages of a memoir. I 
reproduce this copyrighted image in an entirely different context, for a different purpose, and for 
a different audience; I therefore have transformed its use. I employ this image for the purpose of 
making a scholarly argument about the marketing strategy of the memoir and how this strategy 
speaks to larger cultural ideas about weight loss and self-help. My analysis is for nonprofit and 
research/scholarship purposes and directed toward cultural studies and other scholars. I have 
reproduced the image in its entirety because I analyze this image at length in my thesis, and both 
the before and the after portions of the image are crucial to my argument—they cannot be 
separated. Moreover, my use has no effect whatsoever on the market of the memoir.  
 
